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This thesis compares irredentism and revanchism in the cases of Nazi Germany 
and contemporary Russia with regard to violent and coercive changes of borders and the 
celebration of war and soldiers as an element of statecraft. It conducts a critical analysis 
of the comparisons often made between Nazi Germany’s Anschluss with Austria in 1938 
and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The analysis has relevant implications for 
U.S. national security policy through the evaluation of revanchist tendencies in an area 
with U.S. national security interests. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, a body of scholarly work grew 
comparing the politics and social dynamics of the newly democratic Russian Federation 
to those of Weimar Germany after World War I. While Russia’s intervention in the 2008 
crisis in Georgia raised eyebrows and provoked international criticism, Russia did not 
annex any Georgian territory, but erected puppet states with stalemated territorial 
conflicts that, nonetheless, compromised Georgian sovereignty. In other words, Russia 
occupied two Georgian provinces and recognized them as independent states. In the next 
phase of revisionism, the Russian Federation’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 
2014 sparked a slew of comparisons between Adolf Hitler and President Vladimir Putin 
of Russia. The comparisons were made not only by opinion makers and other journalists, 
but also by high-ranking politicians and public figures. The evolution of the comparisons, 
with the phrase “Weimar Russia” and portrayals of a Hitlerian Putin, gained traction in 
the West beyond scholarly circles as the Crimean annexation was compared by many in 
Europe and America to Germany’s Anschluss with Austria in the years 1921–1938. 
Although no historical analogy is perfect, this particular one deserves 
investigation due to its implications for the European order and its value for 
understanding contemporary conflict, especially the overused concept of “hybrid war.” 
The comparison shifted from one regarding a government with weak democratic 
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traditions and antagonistic political movements and a desire to be regarded as a great 
power to that of an authoritarian leader with a revanchist political program. The 
comparisons between Hitler’s Pan-German aspirations and Putin’s pan-Russian ones 
have grabbed attention because they could imply that the Russian case might escalate into 
further territorial and political expansion and eventually a large-scale war. 
On the other hand, Hitler comparisons are easy to make and carry with them a 
powerful polemical impact with both general and academic audiences. The Crimean 
annexation and the Austrian Anschluss are not the only territorial acquisitions based on 
irredentist claims, just as Vladimir Putin is not the first leader since Hitler to exhibit 
authoritarian tendencies coupled with the use of force and integral nationalism. The 
comparison of these accessions of neighboring land is nevertheless significant and 
warrants critical analysis. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate rigorously a 
contemporary interpretation of a potential threat to the Euro-Atlantic security order from 
a revanchist power by comparing these two case studies. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of literature that addresses the proposed thesis topic directly is limited 
in academic sources. While comparisons involving Nazi Germany and contemporary 
Russia are made frequently in both the media and scholarly articles, the analogies are 
brief and typically address only the broader characteristics of the leaders and their 
territorial acquisitions. The fall of the Soviet Union sparked analysis and debate over the 
similarities and differences between the Weimar Republic in the inter-war years (1919–
1933) and the post-Soviet, ostensibly democratic Russian Federation. The chronological 
continuation of this comparison leads to one between Hitler and Putin. Such comparisons 
have become increasingly prevalent in commentaries concerning recent Russian foreign 
policy. 
The literature comparing Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia is extensive. 
While a number of scholars agree concerning certain similarities between these two 
troubled post-imperial democracies, there is disagreement over the particulars and 
validity of the analogy. Most of the literature from the 1990s following the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union concentrated on striking similarities between the two post-imperial 
democracies (the Weimar Republic and the Russian Federation) and the potential in the 
latter for a transition into authoritarian rule, which was the end result of the Weimar 
Republic. Extensive research into the political landscape of the post-Communist Russian 
Federation has evaluated the threat of a revanchist regime with certain characteristics 
similar to fascism taking power. 
Hitler and Mussolini comparisons abound in the literature as well as in the 
rhetoric referring to the German and Italian fascist icons that emerged after the fall of the 
Soviet regime.1 Although many contemporaries viewed the comparison as strikingly apt, 
some held that the social and political characteristics of post-Soviet Russia would not 
allow a transition to fascism because of the suffering that Nazi aggression during the 
World War II brought to the population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR).2 
The main difficulty with the Weimar Russia analogy is that there are only two 
cases from which to develop the correlation and hypotheses as to trends and causation.3 
More recent analyses of post-imperial democracies address party ideologies in fledgling 
democracies and expound on the lack of ideologies other than nationalism and an 
assertion of moral superiority in post-Soviet Russia. These analyses minimize the 
potential for a shift to fascism but acknowledge the authoritarian tendencies of Putin’s 
regime.4 
Weimar Russia comparisons expound on the myth of the internal enemy that was 
infamous in Weimar Germany. Revanchists in Russia have asserted that there was a 
betrayal from within by the democrats with the aid of Western forces.5 The post-World 
                                                 
1 Alexandre Yanov, Weimar Russia: And What We Can Do About It (New York: Slovo-Word 
Publishing House, 1995), 83. 
2 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1996): 371–72. 
3 Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, “The Weimar/Russia Comparison,” Post-Soviet Affairs 
13, no. 3 (1997): 254, doi: 10.1080/1060586X.1997.10641439. 
4 Stephen E. Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic 
France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 237. 
5 Yanov, Weimar Russia, 87. 
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War I analogy continues its likeness with the end of the Cold War in that a great power is 
not defeated on the battlefield, but is the victim of treaties that diminish its territory and 
limit its military forces during an hour of weakness.6 Furthermore, the powerful anti-
Western sentiment in rhetoric among nationalist groups in Russia and its spread into 
wider politics as pro-Western sentiments are branded as anti-patriotic have further 
parallels with the Weimar Right.7 
Scholars wrote much of the literature regarding the “Weimar Russia” comparison 
prior to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and there is not much mention of Russian 
revanchist tendencies or potential immediately following the fall of the USSR. The 
comparison to Germany’s aspirations toward Czechoslovakia and Austria is particularly 
limited and not well developed.8 Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russian 
forces and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Anschluss analogies abounded. The 
Moscow Times ran an article calling the annexation “Putin’s Crimean Anschluss” and 
directly comparing the West’s response to appeasement in 1938 with its reaction in 2014, 
while Hillary Clinton, Wolfgang Schäuble, Prince Charles, and several other notable 
figures publicly compared Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler.9 Analysis of metaphorical 
mentions relating Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler in Western media—particularly English-
language mass media—reveals that the frequency of use of the analogy directly 
corresponds to aggressive Russian foreign policy actions.10 
                                                 
6 Leonid Luks, “‘Weimar Russia?’ Notes on a Controversial Concept,” Russian Politics and Law 46, 
no. 4 (2008): 47, doi: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940460403; “Hanson and Kopstein, “Weimar/Russia 
Comparison,” 259. 
7 Luks, “‘Weimar Russia?’” 51. 
8 Timothy J. Colton and Robert Levold, After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nations (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1992), 100. 
9 Victor Davidoff, “Putin’s Crimean Anschluss,” Moscow Times, March 3, 2014, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-s-crimean-anschluss/495462.html; Philip Rucker, 
“Hillary Clinton Says Putin’s Actions Are Like ‘What Hitler Did Back in the ‘30s,’” Washington Post, 
March 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/03/05/hillary-clinton-says-
putins-action-are-like-what-hitler-did-back-in-the-30s/; Christian Reiermann, “Fighting Words: Schäuble 
Says Putin’s Crimea Plans Reminiscent of Hitler,” Spiegel Online International, March 31, 2014, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/schaeuble-compares-putin-moves-in-crimea-to-policies-of-
hitler-a-961696.html; Bridget Kendall, “Vladimir Putin Condemns Prince Charles’ ‘Nazi’ Remarks,” BBC, 
May 24, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27558825. 
10 Eugenia Kuznetsova, “Underlying Meanings of the Hitler Metaphor in Western Media,” Journal of 
Mass Communication and Journalism 4, no. 10 (2014): 5, doi: 10.4172/2165-7912.1000230. 
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Granted, the time elapsed since the fall of the Third Reich and access to archives 
have led to a vast body of work regarding the Nazis, while Putin’s regime is largely a 
mystery to outsiders and continues to be dynamic. In particular, the scarcity of official 
information regarding the invasion and annexation of Crimea makes a comprehensive 
and precise comparison to the Nazi Anschluss with Austria difficult. Nevertheless, the 
outward political implications and similarities and the narratives associated with each are 
relevant in analyzing the nature of the land grabs. The reinterpretations of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and pan-Slavic Russian nationalist rhetoric among Russian politicians11 
are comparable to the ideas expressed by certain post-1918 Pan-German political 
movements.12 
Furthermore, both cases involved international agreements that banned the 
reunification of territories and were disregarded. Both the Versailles and St. Germain 
Treaties stipulated that Germany would “respect strictly the independence of Austria.”13 
Similarly, the Russian Federation agreed to “respect the independence and sovereignty and 
the existing borders of Ukraine” in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances.14 The regional distributions of supporters of pan-national movements are 
similarly parallel as Pan-German sentiment in Austria was limited to Tyrol and other 
localities,15 much like pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine is geographically confined to 
Crimea and the Donbass.16 The preceding political struggles in the capitals (Vienna and 
Kiev) summon comparable, although divergent, paths. While the Nazi placement of 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart into power was the result of constant political and para-military 
                                                 
11 Mikhail Suslov, “Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary 
Pan-Slavism,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 53, no. 5 (2012): 576, doi: 10.2747/ 
1539-7216.53.5.575. 
12 Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 200), 6. 
13 Rolf Steininger, Austria, Germany, and the Cold War: From the Anschluss to the State Treaty (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 6. 
14 “Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 
5, 1994, http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-
security-assurances-1994/p32484. 
15 Steininger, Austria, Germany, and the Cold War, 4. 
16 Orlando Figes, “Is There One Ukraine? The Problem with Ukrainian Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 
Special Collection: Crisis in Ukraine (December 2013). 
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pressure from the Nazis as a part of Operation Otto—the invasion of Austria17—Putin’s 
“hybrid war” seizure of institutions in Crimea with unmarked Special Forces appeared to 
be a reaction to Moscow’s waning influence in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution 
and Kiev’s diplomacy in pursuit of an association agreement with the European Union.18 
The most authoritative and informative historical studies of the Anschluss appear 
to be Evan Burr Bukey’s Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945 
and Rolf Steininger’s Austria, Germany and the Cold War: From the Anschluss to the 
State Treaty, 1938–1955, Brigitte Hamann’s Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s 
Apprenticeship19 and Jurgen Gehl’s Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss: 1931–193820 
give further insight. 
With regard to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Roy Allison has contributed an 
extensive account in his article in International Affairs.21 Among the primary sources, the 
March 2014 address by Russian President Putin on the annexation of Crimea stands 
out.22 
The initial literature review regarding this thesis topic reveals that, while there is a 
small swath of literature that has made early comparisons of the two fragile post-imperial 
democracies, the comparison has not been extensively applied to the current Ukraine 
crisis and its further implications. Through a review of the abundant historical works on 
Nazi Pan-German actions leading to World War II and comparison with recent scholarly 
work regarding the Ukraine crisis and pan-national sentiment in Russia, this thesis 
evaluates the validity of the comparisons between Nazi Germany and contemporary 
                                                 
17 Steininger, Austria, Germany, and the Cold War, 7. 
18 Keith Darden, “Ukraine’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs, (March 3, 2014), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-03/ukraines-crisis-legitimacy. 
19 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship, trans. Thomas Thornton (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999). 
20 Jurgen Gehl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss: 1931–1938 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1963). 
21 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” 
International Affairs 90, no. 6 (November 2014), doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12170. 
22 Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” March 18, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 
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Russia, notably with regard to the German Anschluss with Austria and the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. This analytical comparison may throw light on broader issues, 
including nationalism, militarism, and foreign policy goals and the decision-making of 
the top leaders. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first and most extreme possible explanation and hypothesis is that the fall of 
the Soviet Union begat a scenario—similar to that of Weimar Germany in the inter-war 
years—that was conducive to the rise of authoritarian rule. Regardless of the attempts to 
build democratic institutions and the opening of Russian markets and society, the rise of 
Vladimir Putin and his invasions of Georgia and Ukraine bear sufficient resemblances to 
Hitler’s rise to power and land-grabs prior to World War II. This suggests that, in 
conjunction with other causative factors, additional Russian politico-military campaigns 
for territorial expansion are possible in the future. The nationalistic pan-Slavism rhetoric 
in modern Russian politics and Putin’s security guarantees to Russian-speaking 
minorities suggest an aspiration to future conquests that may resemble Hitler’s 
acquisition of Austria and the Czech Sudetenland prior to his invasion of Poland. 
On the other hand, further research may show that, despite striking resemblances 
between Hitler’s and Putin’s undertakings in states in similar socio-political situations, 
the resemblances are merely indicative of pan-national dictators in general. The recent 
references and comparisons to Hitler in the media are effective in portraying authoritarian 
leaders as aggressive due to the near-universal recognition of the Nazi dictator. At present 
it appears that Putin’s ambitions are not likely to escalate into large-scale conventional or 
nuclear war in pursuit of large territorial gains, but rather will remain confined to small 
areas with Russian-speaking populations that are unlikely to result in dangerous 
confrontations between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
This thesis proposes to investigate the related hypothesis that Putin’s recent 
ambitions and actions in Russia’s “near abroad” are the result of neo-pan-Slavism and 
nationalism and an attempt to regain some of the Soviet Union’s former territories using 
pan-national rhetoric framed as Russian patriotism. The annexation of Crimea and the 
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Austrian Anschluss bear similarities—as do many land grabs—but do not necessarily 
indicate a Russian potential for global revisionism. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis, as discussed earlier, conducts case studies of pivotal territorial 
acquisitions by post-Soviet Russia and post-Imperial Germany in a focused comparison 
designed to substantiate or discredit the popular comparisons in the media and political 
discourse of the policies of these regimes. 
In other words, in light of the actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea, the 
thesis investigates and compares the Pan-German movements leading up to the Nazi 
acquisitions of Austria before World War II to pan-Slavic and pan-Russian movements. 
The character of modern Russian movements is evaluated with regard to rising 
nationalism and the potential for further territorial acquisitions. In particular, the sharp 
rise in analogies in the media and political discourse between the Austrian Anschluss and 
the annexation of Crimea is investigated in order to assess to what extent the comparison 
is valid. 
While the body of historical works on Nazi Germany is vast, this thesis 
concentrates on studies that evaluate the popular sentiment in Austria prior to and 
following the Anschluss and the political events leading to the Anschluss. The body of 
work regarding Russian pan-Slavism and recent turmoil is less extensive and more 
fragmented, but available in academic journals and periodicals. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I outlines the research goals and 
introduce the topic. Chapter II offers a case study of Nazi Germany’s Anschluss with 
Austria. Chapter III presents a case study of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, including 
factors such as the resurgence of Russian nationalism. In Chapter IV, the annexation of 
Crimea is analytically compared to the Austrian Anschluss. Chapter V offers conclusions. 
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II. ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE ANSCHLUSS 
The second sentence of Adolf Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf, describes his 
birthplace, Braunau am Inn, astride the border of Bavaria and Upper Austria, as “situated 
just on the frontier of those two States the reunion of which seems…a task to which we 
should devote our lives.” Hitler adds, “German–Austria must be restored to the great 
German Motherland.”23 A primary goal of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
(NSDAP) was the Anschluss—or connection—of what after 1919 was known as 
German–Austria to Nazi Germany. That is, the Nazis sought the union of those lands that 
the Prussians had expelled from the German state in the 19th century and that now longed 
for unity as a goal of statecraft, not solely limited to the National Socialists. When this 
goal was achieved in March 1938, it constituted the most aggressive move of Nazi 
irredentism since Hitler’s chancellorship began in 1933. Described somewhat 
simplistically as “the first victim of Hitler-ite aggression” in the Allies’ 1943 Moscow 
Declaration, the Republic of Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany in a surprise coup de 
main in March 1938 that followed five years of more or less cold or hybrid war oriented 
to accomplishing this end.24 The crowds of cheering Austrians that greeted the invading 
German troops in Salzburg and Vienna and the plebiscite less than a month later, 
however, suggest an outcome other than simple victimhood. The bloodless invasion 
quickly led to the vicious persecution via spontaneous pogroms against Jews and other 
innovations in Nazi “ethnic cleansing.”25 Nazi policy also included the neutralization of 
the authoritarian government that itself had pushed aside democracy in Austria in early 
1933. 
Although Habsburg loyalists, Socialists, and Jews in 1938 were certainly 
victimized by invading National Socialists, it is evident that a vast majority of Austrians 
embraced the Anschluss as righting an old wrong worked by Bismarck and corrected by 
                                                 
23 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Ahmedabad: Jaico Publishing House, 2012), 1. 
24 Steininger, Austria, Germany, and the Cold War, 13. 
25 A term popularized in the 1990s after the Bosnian War, “ethnic cleansing” has been retroactively 
applied to the Holocaust; Toal and Dahlman, Bosnia Remade, 1. 
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Hitler. Irredentism and revanchism in Europe make no sense without taking into account 
the case of Austria in the inter war period and its half-coerced, half-voluntary 
incorporation into Hitler’s Germany in the spring of 1938. In order to make sense of this 
story, however, one must assess a longer record of nationalism in central Europe. 
This chapter elucidates the evolution of the idea of Pan-Germanism within the 
Habsburg Empire and the territories of the First Austrian Republic (1918–1938) and 
analyzes the popular and political sentiment concerning a greater Germany. This chapter 
shows how these factors affected the ultimate political actions that resulted in the 
successful invasion and annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. 
A. PAN-GERMANISM IN AUSTRIA 
Despite the efforts of the House of Bourbon and the Porte in Constantinople over 
a period of centuries until the 18th century, the Habsburg Empire emerged as the leading 
power of Central Europe with little regard for nations in the modern sense of this term in 
the 17th and 18th centuries. Via a policy of peaceful coalitions and warlike alliances and 
conquests, especially in the wake of Ottoman retreat from the Danube after the 17th 
century, the Habsburg Empire symbolized the continuation of the 1st German Reich. It 
also comprised the nations and nationalities along the Danube and the Balkans in a 
multinational dynastic empire focused on the estates of the church, the court, the army 
and its administration. The Josephine epoch of reform despotism in Enlightenment 
Europe included the steps of administrative reform and, joined with the French 
Revolution, presently gave energy to the nationalities conflicts that emerged in the 
transition from the 18th to the 19th century. These phenomena were especially fateful in 
Central Europe and in what eventually went from medieval and classical Germany after 
1648 in the early modern period to the modern order of nation states in central Europe 
with the attempt by the nations of central Europe to become nation states on the western 
European model. Here the idea of Greater Germany became a central idea in the process 
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of folklore, propaganda, and mass movement associated with the practice of the cultural 
nation.26 
 As a prelude to this story, however, in 1784, the reformist son of Empress Maria 
Theresa, Emperor Joseph II, issued a linguistic decree making German the official 
language of government and commerce in the Hapsburg Empire. This edict concerned the 
estates of administration and economics as well as culture, but was devoid of the 
nationalist meaning that came to be associated with such a measure in the hyper-charged 
atmosphere of politics a century later. The use of German in this regard was akin to the 
contemporary use of English in the globalized computer or aviation activities, and had no 
political meaning, per se. The decree was a measure to increase the efficiency of a multi-
lingual empire, that is, its interoperability, where German was spoken in more provinces 
than any other language.27 In the decades that followed, with the impact of the French 
Revolution on the nations of Central Europe, the process of folklore, propaganda, and 
mass movement operated among those social and political groups who identified with the 
nation as a cultural entity devoid of its home in a strong state. This process unfolded in 
French-occupied western Germany and Tyrol, where Vienna had more or less been the 
leading metropole until 1806, and spread after 1815 to Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, 
Belgrade and beyond. 
The idea of the nation and nation state on the cultural foundation was, in turn, 
repressed for a generation by the post-1815 Congress Europe led by Prince Metternich in 
the Habsburg attempt to crush the ideas of the French revolution together with the 
combined energies of the Northern Courts of Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna.28 With the 
outbreak of the Revolutions of 1848 in Central Europe, however, the Austro-Germans 
began their nationalistic awakening with the fate of either a Greater Germany or a 
Smaller Germany, in which the Habsburg crown lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, and 
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Slovenia, etc.) bulked as an enduring issue. National movements developed among the 
Italian, Czech, and Hungarian minorities of the empire from 1789 until 1848, and the 
German-speakers grew to feel threatened, especially as the Klein Deutschland concept 
emerged as an option for German unity with the advent of Bismarck’s chancellery in 
1862.29 The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and subsequent unification of Germany under 
Kaiser Wilhelm I in 1871 meant that the Deutsch Österreicher, who for a thousand years 
had been the core of the Reich, was unceremoniously shunted to the periphery. They 
were now lodged among Slavs and Magyars, with a united Germany towering over them. 
The hunger of the subject peoples of the crown lands for their own nation states only 
became more intense after the Ausgleich of 1866 in which the Habsburg Empire had been 
divided into its western and eastern halves with the recognition of Hungarian national 
status.30 
1. Role Models of a Dictator 
In the waning years of the Habsburg Empire after 1866, the presence of pro-
national Greater German attitudes was evident in day-to-day life. When Emperor Franz 
Joseph and his entourage paraded through Linz in Upper Austria, schoolchildren had to 
be instructed explicitly that they were not to greet the Emperor with the “Heil!” of 
German-nationals, but the Habsburg “Hoch!” Pan-Nationalist displays were 
surreptitiously celebrated with the adornment of cornflowers, the singing of “Deutschland 
Über Alles” instead of the imperial anthem, and the display of red, black, and gold colors. 
A young Hitler was scolded by Habsburg teachers for arranging his red, black, and gold 
pencils in a show of nationalist pride in an empire that resisted integral nationalism as it 
manifested itself after 1880. Bound by loyalty to the Habsburgs as civil servants, the high 
school teachers of the dual monarchy encouraged their students to “study diligently lest 
we in Austria lose our leading role.”31 
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The massive influx of immigrants to Vienna from the mid-19th century onward 
from such provinces as Moravia and Galicia strengthened the xenophobic core of the 
movement—particularly against middle class and assimilated Jews who remained loyal to 
the court. The vibrant and vicious Pan-German political movement in Vienna from the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries had a lasting impact on the civil consciousness of and 
the future architect of the Anschluss—Adolf Hitler. Georg Ritter von Schönerer was the 
most influential personality in the Pan-German movement of the fin de siècle. Schönerer 
notably joined anti-Semitic dogma with Pan-German rhetoric in Habsburg Austria after 
1890. Popular with the growing middle classes, von Schönerer’s movement was “anti-
Habsburg, antiliberal, anti-Catholic, anti-capitalist, antisocialist, and, above all, anti-
Semitic.”32 Even though discrimination against Jews was legally abolished during the 
reign of Emperor Francis Joseph I, anti-Semitic rhetoric was ubiquitous in Austrian 
politics with a long tradition reaching back to the Counter Enlightenment and episodic 
expulsions of Jews amid crises.33 Schönerer’s use of ethnic hatred as an explanation for 
the social and political tribulations of a multi-ethnic empire made anti-Semitic and 
xenophobic attitudes central to the Pan-German movement.34 Although Schönerer lost his 
parliamentary seat in 1907 and likely never met the future dictator, Hitler was witness to 
the demagogue’s cult of personality in the Vienna of the turn of the century.35 
Schönerer’s influence persisted as his young disciples went on to dominate municipal life 
in multiple provinces as civic figures,36 as well as political figures in Vienna.37 These 
individuals ensured that xenophobia as the lowest common denominator became a 
leading feature of political life, with the answer resting with union with the German 
Reich. 
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Schönerer was not alone in his fear-mongering, and politicians exploited mass 
politics in the polls in the 1880s and 1890s.38 The charismatic Catholic politician Karl 
Lueger—a staunch anti-Semite and colleague of Schönerer—founded the Christian 
Social Party between 1888 and 1889 and was elected Mayor of Vienna in 1897.39 
Extremely popular and well-loved for his modernization and Germanization of the 
capital, Lueger was lauded by Hitler as “the greatest German mayor of all times,” and the 
failed art student was in attendance at his funeral procession in 1910.40 
Two more Pan-German Schönerian disciples had an enormous effect on Hitler: 
Karl Hermann Wolf and Franz Stein. Wolf was a journalist-turned-politician whose 
successes and view of Czechs as “the main enemy”41 would eventually distance him from 
his original patron in Schönerer.42 Stein, a fierce advocate of German workers and 
founder of the “German National Workers Association,”43 was known for blatant attacks 
on the Habsburgs in favor of the annexation of peripheral provinces by the German 
empire.44 The politicians, however, were extremely divided on the extremity of their 
dogma of whether Czechs or Jews were the “main enemy.” The politicians would 
frequently hurl insults at each other publicly and in propaganda as they vied for similar 
electoral districts.45 Living in Vienna from 1908 to 1913, Adolf Hitler was deeply 
influenced by these political figures and the anti-Semitic, xenophobic, Pan-German 
doctrine they espoused.46 A young, impressionable painter in the men’s hostels, Hitler 
would carry these convictions through the rest of his political career. 
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2. Interwar Currents of Anschluss 
In the twilight of the World War I in the phase 1916–1918, the dissolution of the 
Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire presented a brief moment of promise for an 
Anschluss of the German nation. Ostensibly the only force keeping German–Austria from 
unification with the German Reich, the polyglot empire’s death throes proved hopeful for 
Pan-Germans. On October 14, 1918, in the final moments of his time as virtual dictator of 
wartime Germany, Erich von Ludendorff penned a letter to the German Foreign Ministry 
stating that “the question is increasingly being discussed whether the time has not come 
to prepare the Anschluss [of Austria] with the German Reich.”47 Nevertheless, the 
concept of Ludendorff and other generals consisted of a more authoritarian approach to 
ensure “military and political domination in the East.”48 Conceived before the German 
plea for an armistice, the Versailles Treaty, and the Treaty of St. Germain, this concept 
seems wishful in retrospect. Allied—particularly French—security concerns about a 
resurgent Germany stymied these aspirations quickly and decisively. Furthermore, the 
economic crises of the interwar period served to exacerbate the German nationalist 
sentiment in Austria fueled by ethnic resentment. While the radical right in Austria was 
by no means a united front for an Anschluss with Germany, it fostered an environment 
that was not hostile to the concept. 
As the Habsburg Empire was crumbling in late 1918, a new German–Austrian 
(Deutsch-Österreich) state ratified a constitution that declared “German Austria is an 
integral part of the German Republic.” Its provisional Chancellor—Karl Renner—gave 
an ardent speech on the day of ratification acknowledging the desperate state of the 
German people, and reassuring them that “German people in all regions should know that 
we are of one tribe and one mind.”49 Originally created as an autonomous state within the 
German Reich with Vienna sharing capital status, it was an effort by the Pan-German 
elements of the socialist movements in Austria. The polity would be short-lived. 
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According to French Foreign Minister Stéphen Pichon, the victors “must see that 
Germany is not given an opportunity to rebuild her strength by utilizing the Austrian 
populations.”50 Accordingly, Germany was forced to acknowledge in Article 80 of the 
Versailles Treaty that it would “respect strictly the independence of Austria.”51 In 
September 1919, German–Austria would sign the Treaty of St. Germain that had a 
parallel clause: “The independence of Austria is inalienable …. Consequently, Austria 
undertakes … to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means 
whatever compromise her independence, … by participation in the affairs of another 
power.”52 Georges Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson allowed a caveat that the League 
of Nations could approve such actions, but France’s interests would likely curb any such 
ambitions.53 The Pan-German aspirations of Austria were dashed with these agreements 
and German–Austria became the Republic of Austria with the National Assembly’s 
declaration that “in pursuance of the State Treaty of Saint Germain the previous legal 
provision under which German Austria was declared an integral part of the German 
Reich ceases to be in force.”54 
The downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the controversial peace 
settlements resulted in a drastic increase in Pan-German sentiment in the Austrian 
populace and government, despite the post-war agreements.55 The transition from an 
Empire to a small state aggravated the Austro-German identity crisis and resulted in the 
deepening of political rifts concurrent with economic discord.56 Provinces took their own 
initiatives. Tyrol and Vorarlberg severed diplomatic ties with Vienna and sent embassies 
to Switzerland. Tyrol, Salzburg, and Styria all held plebiscites to join the German Reich 
with staggering results in the affirmative.57 Furthermore, despite reaffirming the Treaty 
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of St. Germain in order to receive a loan from the League of Nations, Austria coordinated 
railroad, traffic, probate law, and visa regulations with the German Republic. The 
Austrian Army also changed its traditional green uniforms to emulate the German field 
gray in light of a general admiration of the German military’s prowess.58 These changes 
were all met with public acclaim. Nevertheless, when Austria and Germany sought a 
customs union under the auspices of Pan-European economic cooperation, it was met 
with resistance from the League of Nations and led to devastating results. 
Austria’s “inability to be self-sufficient” economically was reflected in its loan 
request from the League of Nations and its pursuit of customs union arrangements until 
1931.59 France’s stipulation that Austria surrender domestic control of its financial 
system, however, was politically infeasible. In a display of suspicion and its relatively 
strong financial position, France withdrew all its assets from the Austrian Creditanstalt 
and precipitated a ruinous economic crisis60 that resulted in the near-collapse of the 
Austrian banking sector, a dramatic slowdown of the Austrian industrial sector, and 
greater than 30 percent unemployment.61 
The Pan-German sentiment of the late 19th century was imbued with a heavily 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic conviction by the conservative icons that championed the 
German nationalist movement in Vienna and in provinces with markedly German culture. 
Growing up on the periphery of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Adolf Hitler was exposed 
to Pan-German influences from an early age and later immersed in these political circles 
during his residency in the capital. Moreover, European security concerns over a 
resurgent Germany prohibited any political or economic unions following World War I, 
despite Austrian and German political will from the left and right. The dogma of the 
fiercest advocates of—and opponents to—a united Germany and Austria does not 
necessarily explain the outpouring of support as Nazi vehicles rolled across the border. In 
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the next section, the popular sentiment of the Austrian people is analyzed in conjunction 
with the political rifts that would eventually lead to the fall of the First Austrian Republic. 
B. POPULAR SENTIMENT BEFORE THE ANSCHLUSS 
Images of masses in Austria waving Swastika flags as they welcomed goose-
stepping soldiers abounded in the newsreels of Nazi Germany. When asked in a 
referendum in April 1938, “Are you in agreement with the reunification of Austria and 
the German Reich that occurred in 13 March 1938 and do you support the candidates of 
our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler?” more than two thirds of the population voted, and more than 
99 percent in the affirmative.62 Despite these deceptively glowing displays of approval, 
studies suggest that the majority preferred independence to German rule, but deep 
political divisions, domestic unrest, and economic strife left Austrians envious of German 
progress and ready for a drastic change from the struggles since 1918. The small German 
Austrian state was not viewed as a viable polity by most Austrians, and unification with 
Germany was a desired goal in the years from 1918 to 1938, despite the efforts of some 
Austrians to secure support for a new national identity. A vicious domestic struggle just 
short of civil war, however, left the First Republic of Austria vulnerable to its dominant 
neighbor. 
1. The People 
Demographic shifts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries instilled a xenophobic 
attitude in borderlands and the capital that only heightened with the onset of the interwar 
economic crisis. As many citizens’ employment was threatened by foreigners, contempt 
for the political system grew amid social unrest from embattled paramilitary groups and 
labor organizations. All the while, their German neighbor was rebounding. Although the 
majority of Austrians did not subscribe to the tenets of National Socialism, they 
welcomed change and hoped for prosperity. Nevertheless, the long-standing history of 
xenophobia and ethnic hatred in Austria was evident as the minority fervently embraced 
Nazi principles with disproportionate involvement in the regime’s institutions. 
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As previously noted, the substantial influx of Jewish immigrants was a significant 
pillar of Pan-German politics. Between 1857 and 1910, the Jewish diaspora grew to 
comprise 8.63 percent of the Austrian population. Since the Jewish migrants were 
typically skilled and well educated, the established tradesmen and small-businesses grew 
to resent their competitors almost instantaneously. By 1910, Jews comprised “71 percent 
of Vienna’s financiers, 63 percent of its industrialists, 65 percent of its lawyers, 59 
percent of its physicians, and over half of its journalists.”63 This control of the middle 
strata by a distinctly different ethnic group fostered resentment among the students and 
pre-industrial artisans who were threatened by the competition.64 
On the labor front, the Austrian working class faced a similar migrant flow due to 
the growing industrial sector. Between 1880 and 1910, the number of factories in the 
outer districts of Habsburg Austria grew by 133 percent.65 With the rise of railroads and 
modern transportation, the migrant flow—particularly of “unskilled Czechs”—increased 
sharply. This perceived threat led to the founding of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei on the 
Bohemian-Silesian border. Led by and composed of workingmen who rebuffed the 
canons of Marxism and internationalism, the party was the direct precursor to the 
Austrian Nazi Party.66 The discord between German nationalist and Czech politicians in 
the decades prior to the fall of the Habsburg dynasty was calamitous, routinely escalating 
to violent brawls in Parliament.67 As Czechs grew to comprise one-fifth of the population 
of Vienna by 1910, German–Austrians began to fear the “Slavization” of their 
homeland,68 because the demographic trend was perceived as not just un-German, but 
anti-German.69 
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These demographic pressures would be further amplified following World War I 
and the economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s. Since much of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire’s wealth was generated from trade, the high tariffs among the successor states and 
the broken pattern of regional commerce after the war devastated the economy. 
Furthermore, the withdrawal of French assets from the Creditanstalt mentioned earlier 
plunged the banking sector toward collapse in 1931.70 While the Austrian economic 
situation was worsening, however, Austrians saw the National Socialist system across the 
border after 1933 generating jobs and creating what was presented as an increasingly 
classless society. The contrast to the Christian Social Party’s organic state enacted by the 
Dollfuss regime was evident. Germany was a country whose military might and culture 
were admired and shared, and the rural and working classes of Austria pined for similar 
achievements.71 In Vienna, though, political rifts were deepening and social unrest was 
rising toward civil war. 
2. The Politics 
Although Pan-Germanism was a goal on both the left and the right in Austria 
following the World War I, such hopes were dashed by the Little Entente with the 
Versailles and St. Germain treaties and the affiliation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Yugoslavia with French statecraft in Central Europe. The ensuing political struggle for 
control between 1918 and 1938 was vicious, bordering on near-civil war. In-fighting not 
only between the left and right, but also within the conservative right would eventually 
pave the way to invasion. Politicians vied for parliamentary majorities and intellectuals to 
support their ideologies. The right bestowed the moniker of “Red Vienna” in order to 
portray the city as a bastion of socialism and as a caution against Marxist and Bolshevist 
forces.72 While Austrian politics were certainly left-leaning in the interwar period, 
conservatives maintained a powerful and dynamic opposition. With the shift toward 
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authoritarian fascism in the late 1920s, Austrian politics and their quarrelsome character 
paved the way for the Anschluss. 
The early inter-war years were fraught with confusion as the former Habsburg 
Empire tried to adjust to national identities and new borders set out in the Treaties. Of the 
ten and a half million German Austrians in the empire, only six and a half million would 
remain in the new Austrian republic.73 The immediate aftermath of the Treaties saw the 
aforementioned provincial plight of self-determination in Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, 
and Styria. When the post-war dominance of the leftist Social Democrats shifted right 
with the elections of 1920 and the emergence of the Christian Social Party as the largest, 
Austria became governed by a “series of conservative ‘bourgeois’ coalitions” to restore 
the state to its previous grandeur and “normalcy.”74 These “Black Viennese” (i.e., pro-
clerical) forces were, however, hardly homogenous; their only uniting values being 
“radical anti-Semitism, German nationalism, volkish authoritarianism, anti-
Enlightenment (and antimodernist) thinking, and corporatism” around a common 
program of “defeating social democracy, replacing democratic, capitalist Austria, 
excluding Jews and foreigners, and restoring German and Austrian greatness.”75 
The strife between the left (Social Democrats) and the right (Christian Social 
Party members and German Nationalists) would come to a head in the civil disturbances 
of 1927 and marked a distinct turning point as Austria descended toward fascism. Both 
left and right parties had been organizing paramilitary forces since the early 1920s. A 
clash between a veterans’ group and the Social Democrats’ Schutzbund in the village of 
Schattendorf in the eastern province of Burgenland—itself a site of nationalities 
conflicts—left a veteran and a child dead. A jury in Vienna later exonerated the accused. 
In response, massive Socialist demonstrations and protests set fire to the Vienna Palace of 
Justice, an uprising that was only subdued when police opened fire on the crowds, killing 
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nearly ninety people.76 This violence opened a phase of civil war that only ended in 
March 1938 with the Anschluss. When Social Democrats called for a state-wide strike, 
newly-elected Chancellor Ignaz Seipel “embraced…authoritarian rhetoric” and utilized 
paramilitary organizations like the fascist Heimwehr to subdue the uprising.77 
Rising authoritarianism in 1930s Austria saw the growth of a cancerous 
movement within it, Nazism. In conflict with the Christian Social fascism based on the 
Italian model, the Austrian Nation Socialist German Workers’ Party was a marginal 
movement fraught with in-fighting before 1931. Nevertheless, it started to gain electoral 
victories in Vienna, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, and Carinthia by 1930, even 
winning 41 percent of the vote in Innsbruck in 1933.78 While Austrian politics were 
certainly descending into fascism, Nazism was markedly too radical for most right-wing 
Austrian politicians. The Austrian SA and SS79 resorted constantly to methods of 
terrorism to reach Nazism’s goal to undermine the government. The threat from Nazism 
and the schism it created among conservatives served to accelerate the transition to 
authoritarianism after 1932.80 Englebert Dollfuss became Chancellor in 1932 in the wake 
of the financial crisis following the 1931 failed customs union. Following an unpopular 
loan from the League of Nations, German Nationalists, Nazis, and Social Democrats all 
called for new elections. In the face of an impending defeat, Dollfuss suspended the 
parliament and slid further into fascist rule.81 
On one front, Dollfuss attempted in 1933–34 to suppress the leftist opposition 
domestically at the behest of his main supporter and patron—Benito Mussolini. Fearing 
rising German power as well as the older goals of statecraft among the marginal powers, 
the Italian dictator sought a fascist Danubian front against the French-dominated Little 
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Entente and a buffer from the rising power of Germany.82 Pressures on the left broke in 
February 1934 when Heimwehr forces provoked a socialist uprising in Linz. In protest of 
a search for arms, Schutzbund forces opened machine gun fire on police.83 When 
socialist leaders in Vienna called for a general strike, government armed forces and 
police joined in the violence across the nation. Vicious fighting ensued for four days, 
especially in the capital, where more than a hundred government troops and more than 
1,000 socialists were killed.84 The brief civil war resulted in the disbandment of the 
Social Democrats, the filling of concentration camps, and the drafting of a constitution 
that codified a fascist state in the so-called Ständestaat.85 
On a second front, the consolidation of power by Hitler’s Nazis in Berlin and the 
meteoric rise of the Austrian Nazi party in Vienna made Dollfuss suspicious of an 
impending Nazi takeover. Terrorist bombings rocked the country, and Berlin imposed a 
1,000 RM tourist tax that brought the tourism industry—one of Austria’s most 
lucrative—to a standstill. Dollfuss responded with the abolishment of the Nazi party in 
Austria in May 1934.86 The Chancellor’s instincts were well founded: a memorandum by 
the Foreign Ministry in Berlin in 1930 posited that “union with Austria…should be the 
most urgent task of German policy,” and was accompanied with the appointment of a 
Gauleiter in Vienna by Hitler.87 Hitler “ordered an end to direct attacks on the Austrian 
government” in March 1934 and elucidated with Mussolini in Spa in June 1934 that he 
just wanted Dollfuss replaced, not the annexation of Austria.88 Still, the Führer could not 
control the actions of his Austrian compatriots nor the plotting of his armed formations 
and a putsch was attempted by Austrian SA and SS in July. The goal of the coup, led by 
Austrian Nazis in the ranks of the Austrian Army and police, was to storm the 
government building, take Dollfuss hostage, and form a Nazi-led government. 
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Mismanaged and poorly-planned, the government was aware of the plot, and provincial 
Nazi organizations were not given sufficient notice to prepare local takeovers.89 Dollfuss 
was shot in the process of the seizure of power in his office on the Ballhausplatz in 
Vienna, however, and he was denied a doctor and a priest while he bled to death for two 
and a half hours. After the counter attack, the conspirators surrendered later that 
afternoon.90 The action was widely condemned by domestic and international observers, 
and Mussolini massed troops on the Brenner Pass border and pledged military support for 
Austria in the event of an attempted German invasion.91 Mussolini’s reaction deterred 
any German opportunism, and Kurt von Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss. 
The Ständestaat under both Dollfuss and Schuschnigg exhibited anti-Semitic 
undercurrents, albeit not the radical measures prescribed by Schönerer and his disciples. 
Although the May Constitution officially espoused religious equality, many Jews lost 
their jobs or were denied promotions after February 1934. Jews not only represented the 
outsider threat perceived by most Austrians and the right, but also tended to be left-
leaning. Moreover, several leading intellectuals who supported and advocated leftist 
policies were of Jewish descent, such as Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler—who both 
fled the country in exile.92 While fascist Austria was better for Jews than the coming 
Nazi rule, it still had an intrinsic anti-Semitism that was deep-rooted.93 Indeed, “the 
Nazis differed from the other parties ‘only in their willingness to use violence against 
Jews.’”94 
The Ständestaat, while markedly Pan German with its idea that Austria 
manifested a superior ideal of a German nation, advocated an independent Austria as part 
of a tradition of many German states within a German nation. Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, and 
other “Austrofascists” considered Austria a German state. However, they conceived it as 
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a better and more cosmopolitan German state.95 There was also a revitalization of 
Monarchist sentiment as many anti-Habsburg laws were repealed in 1935 and more than 
1,000 municipalities granted honorary citizenship to the surviving heir—Otto von 
Habsburg, the son of the last Kaiser Karl.96 The Monarchists (Österreichische Aktion) 
also advocated further revanchist claims to former Habsburg territories and had 
congruent interests with most Pan-Germans, although they were resolutely against an 
Anschluss and a Prussian-dominated German Reich.97 Like the Monarchists, much of the 
Austrian right advocated an anti-Republican, authoritarian, and anti-Semitic regime, but 
were not satisfied with the Ständestaat and demanded more radical measures.98 
Nevertheless, most of the right rejected Nazism as they were “caught between two 
stools,” according to radical anti-liberal philosopher Othmar Spann, in rejecting both 
Nazism and “Austrofascism.”99 This internal debate and struggle among the 
conservatives in Vienna would “pave the way for Hitler.”100 
The tide changed in 1936 with the ebbing of support from Mussolini as he 
pursued the Ethiopian imperialism that dictated détente and entente with Germany. The 
Italian dictator’s support gave Schuschnigg’s Ständestaat resilience against increased 
pressure from Nazi Germany. When Mussolini shifted his support from Austria to 
Germany following the Ethiopian War in May 1936, the “Austrofascist” regime 
“switched from allying with Italy and Austrian fascists to placating Germany.”101 This 
state of affairs heralded the beginning of the end, even if the statecraft itself was less 
violent in detail. In July 1936, Schuschnigg signed a “gentlemen’s agreement” with 
Germany’s Ambassador to Vienna, Franz von Papen, the ex-officer and man of intrigue 
who had helped Hitler into power a few years earlier. Although the agreement 
acknowledged Vienna’s independence and lifted the economic sanctions, it also absolved 
95 Beller, Concise History of Austria, 225, 
96 Jelavich, Modern Austria, 208–09. 
97 Wasserman, Black Vienna, 133–34. 
98 Ibid., 200. 
99 Ibid., 205. 
100 Ibid., 220. 
101 Bukey, Hitler’s Austria, 15; Beller, Concise History of Austria, 227. 
 26
imprisoned Austrian Nazis and established an “understanding that Austria would conduct 
its foreign policy as a ‘German state.’”102 The agreement legalized a terrorist 
organization and guaranteed quasi-subjugation to its dominant neighbor. With Mussolini 
promising non-intervention in exchange for South Tyrol in September 1937, Germany 
gained the leverage it needed over Austria. On February 12, 1938, the Nazis embraced a 
less gentlemanly approach. After Ambassador von Papen invited Schuschnigg to the 
Eagle’s Nest just across the border, Hitler “terrorized” Schuschnigg and presented him 
with an ultimatum as well as plans to invade Austria if he was not compliant. The 
ultimatum included the release and reinstatement of all Nazis in Austria and the 
appointment of Arthur Seyss-Inquart—an Austrian Nazi—as Minister of the Interior and 
Security. After fulfilling the ultimatum, Schuschnigg scrambled for domestic support, but 
he was unwilling to hand over the government to Otto Habsburg; and the already-
diminished left declared that they would unite against Hitler, but not for Schuschnigg. 
Schuschnigg’s last effort in defiance of Nazi pressure would force Hitler’s hand 
and precipitate the invasion of Austria. Despite opposition from Mussolini, Schuschnigg 
announced a referendum to the Austrian people. They would be asked if they approved of 
“a free and German, independent and social, for a Christian and united Austria, for peace 
and work and the equality of all who declare themselves for Nation and Fatherland.”103 
After hearing of the plebiscite on March 9, 1938, Hitler mobilized the military for 
Operation “Otto,” wrote a letter to Mussolini requesting his approval for invasion, and 
issued three ultimatums on March 11: that Schuschnigg drop the referendum and resign 
his Chancellorship, that the cabinet resign and be reconstituted by Seyss-Inquart, and that 
President Miklas appoint Seyss-Inquart Chancellor. All three conditions were met by 
eleven o’clock that evening, and Schuschnigg ordered the Austrian Army not to fire a 
shot and egress to the east.104 By then, Hitler had signed Directive No. 2 to approve the 
military invasion of Austria, and German troops crossed the border the morning of March 
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12. Chancellor Seyss-Inquart held his office for only two days before signing the 
“Reunification of Austria with the German Reich” into law on the 13.105 
The cheering crowds of people adorned in Swastikas and lining the streets of 
Innsbruck and Vienna surprised even Hitler. Nevertheless, this glee was not ubiquitous 
throughout the country as different provinces and cities met the invading soldiers with 
detached apathy and outright scorn.106 The Nazis wasted little time in fulfilling their 
agenda. Starting on March 12, an extreme and concentrated propaganda campaign rolled 
out in Austria in preparation for the referendum on April 10 concerning the invasion and 
Anschluss. Although, according to Schuschnigg, more than two thirds of Austrians were 
in favor of independence after the invasion,107 the following month would turn that tide. 
Systematic terror was enacted in coordination with the propaganda as more than 21,000 
Austrians were detained and sent to concentration camps in March and April alone;108 
anti-Semitic violence erupted as beatings, murders, humiliations, and arrests spread 
through Vienna “as if medieval pogroms had reappeared in modern dress.”109 Moreover, 
the referendum was given public support by Austrian figureheads: Catholic Bishops and 
Cardinals hailed the bloodless invasion and defense against “godless Bolshevism,” while 
even the former Chancellor and Social Democrat, Karl Renner, declared that he would be 
voting in support of the Anschluss despite his disapproval of its method.110 Distraught 
with economic hardship and frustrated with their own political system, Austrians voted a 
resounding “yes” at the behest of their religious and political leadership. 
Austria was declared as the “first victim of Hitlerite aggression” by the Allies in 
1943, but it is evident that the majority of Austrians did not see themselves as such. The 
Austrian State was absolutely a victim in 1938, but many of its citizens actively 
participated in Nazi policies and endeavors. Although Austrians only comprised eight 
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percent of the German Reich’s population, they made up 14 percent of the SS, 40 percent 
of the personnel, and 75 percent of the commandants in the extermination camps at 
Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka.111 While the Austrian people certainly suffered under the 
Nazi regime, the suffering derived from the aerial bombing campaigns of the Allies, 
service in the Wehrmacht and other Nazi organizations, and Nazi persecution of certain 
minorities.112 Austria’s “victim myth” persisted through the accounts of post-war 
Austrian politicians’ own stories of persecution, in contrast with the Germans’ “collective 
guilt.”113 Nevertheless, it is apparent that the history of Pan-Germanism in Austria 
fostered a sentiment among its majority that could be manipulated to general acceptance 
of the Nazi invasion and seizure of control. Despite the Monarchist, Socialist, 
“Austrofascist,” and foreign forces within the country battling for Austrian independence, 
the desire for political change and dissatisfaction with the status quo of the population 
resulted in a bloodless invasion and active participation in the Nazi regime. 
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III. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMEAN 
ANNEXATION 
Ernest Renan states that “forgetting, and…historical error are an essential factor 
in the creation of a nation.”114 The history of Ukraine proves especially difficult to “get 
right” as its borders and sovereigns have changed with the ebb and flow of the Habsburg, 
Russian, Soviet, and Nazi empires that controlled the territories that lie within modern 
Ukraine. As Ukrainian nationalist movements rose and fell in modern times, different 
interpretations of the past emerged and vanished with these shifts of power. The 
controversy as to whether there is a unique Ukrainian nation or whether Ukraine belongs 
in the Russian nation has led to a political and cultural rift in modern Ukraine and Russia. 
The situation has become confusing for Russians, Ukrainians and people of other nations. 
Russia—Ukraine’s more powerful, although arguably “younger” neighbor—considers 
Ukraine within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Russia deems itself Ukraine’s national 
patron and thus of its blood and soil. Ukraine’s fate seems torn between East and West 
and between Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union and Merkel’s European Union: an 
independent gateway between the East and the West, a satellite of its former imperial 
sovereign, and a privileged partner of the key Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and the 
EU). 
This chapter is divided into three parts: the first section analyzes the history of 
Ukraine and how its various influences have led to the evolution of significantly different 
identities within its borders and how it is perceived by its neighbors. Section B evaluates 
the history of the Crimean Peninsula and how it resulted in markedly different national 
sentiments and its role in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Section C chronicles and evaluates 
the 2014 annexation of Crimea in the context of the previous two sections. 
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A. UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT 
The proto-Ukrainian state of Kievan Rus115 of ancient lineage is claimed as the 
predecessor and founding myth of both the Ukrainian and Russian nations. Nevertheless, 
as Ernest Renan reminded his readers, the idea of a shared destiny in the past and present 
is essential to form a nation. Both nations regard the Rus as their founding myth and 
medieval forebear.116 The centuries of Russian imperial rule of the Ukrainians have 
resulted in a perception of the Ukrainians by the Russians that is central to their national 
destiny as a great power and to Russia’s singular mission of religion and culture. 
Furthermore, since various empires ruled the territory of modern Ukraine, distinct 
policies on nationality rights led to Ukrainian identities developing asymmetrically, 
tangentially, or not at all, depending on the region. This evolution has resulted in 
significantly diverse political tendencies within Ukraine, including a bifurcation between 
the western and eastern points of the compass. 
1. Common Roots? 
The early medieval kingdom of the Kievan Rus is shared by Ukrainians, Russians, 
and Belarussians as the nascent entity from which these nation states have descended. 
The area ruled by the Rus covered western and central Ukraine, most of modern Belarus, 
and western Russia. The Rus were a “loose union of principalities” that were nearly 
perpetually at war with each other, particularly between the northern and southern 
domains. Evidence to the unity of the clans, however, lies mainly in the ancient epic 
poem from the late 12th century, “The Lay of Ihor’s Host,” that portrays the fall of Prince 
Ihor as he rallies the Kievan Rus to push back the Polovtsian steppe invaders, although 
unsuccessfully.117 The early unification of the Rus, however loose and circumstantial, 
created the concept of a pseudo-kingdom where the southern realms—particularly 
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Kiev—held most of the power.118 The Rus language was closer to modern Ukrainian 
than to modern Russian. While the Rus were Christian, their religion had no ties to 
Byzantium or Rome and resembled a “Christian universalism, [with] tolerance toward 
different religious centres.”119 
The sacking of Kiev by the Mongols in 1240 led to the relocation of the Kievan 
rulers to a more defensible position. Since the lower two-thirds of the Rus lands were 
occupied by the invading Mongols of the Golden Horde, Moscow became the seat of the 
Grand Duchy and the eventual precursor of the Russian Empire.120 Russians consider the 
Rus to be their forebears and Kiev the “mother of Russian cities” as Moscow was the 
direct and only successor of Kiev, according to the translatio imperii theory. As such, the 
Rus are central to Russia’s origins as a nation; and the Russians project the “tsardom” all 
the way to Volodymyr the Great of the 10th century, despite his having never used the 
title himself.121 Nonetheless, Kiev—like Moscow—viewed itself as the successor to 
Kievan Rus. Although rebuilding was slow without the support of Poland, Hungary, or 
Serbia against Ukraine’s Mongol occupants, a Ukrainian nation developed in this region. 
Thus, despite the claiming of the Kievan Rus as a founding myth for both Russian and 
Ukrainian national concepts, the Rus were simply “that which existed before the modern 
Ukrainian and Russian nations developed.” It was between 1240 and the 1600s that truly 
separate Ukrainian and Russian identities developed,122 and diverse narratives within 
Ukraine took shape. 
2. “Little Russians” 
In the 17th century, a Cossack Hetmanate rebelled against the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Although the Cossacks’ “quasi-military society…overlapped and 
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interpenetrated”123 with that of Kievan culture and other Rus lands, the Cossacks still 
remained a minority and the cultures never entirely merged into homogenous Rus, 
Ruthenian, or Ukrainian cultures.124 Furthermore, the Hetmanate declared allegiance to 
the Russian Empire at the Council of Pereyaslav in exchange for protection against the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1654. Ukrainian elites became more integrated into 
Russian society due to relatively similar cultures; and although certain Ukrainian cultural 
icons and even music were incorporated into Russian culture, the result was an extremely 
Russified elite caste among the Ukrainian Cossacks and an impoverished peasantry.125 
Consequently, once the nobility of the Hetmanate became assimilated into Russian 
culture, the concept of any distinct Ukrainian culture did not exist among the Russian 
elites.126 Tsar Paul I, who reigned from 1796 to 1801, characterized his subjects as either 
Poles or Russians, Catholics or Orthodox. His binary categorical approach placed 
Ukrainians in a purgatorial existence: ally with their traditional rivals in Poland, or with 
Imperial sovereigns in Russia who did not acknowledge their existence as a distinct 
nation.127 At the time of the Northern War, and the rise of Russia into the Pentarchy of 
the five great powers, in 1708 Hetman Ivan Mazepa and 3,000 Cossacks defected to 
Charles XII of Sweden when Tsar Peter I would not allocate resources to defend 
Hetmanate lands from Poland. According to Mazepa, the Tsar’s refusal to help defend 
Hetmanate lands was a violation of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, but Mazepa’s support for 
Sweden was viewed by the Tsar as the ultimate treachery against Russia.128 Wary of 
rebellious elements in Ukraine, Russia’s rulers took action to ensure that the next two 
hundred years in the Russian empire were markedly anti-Ukrainian. Even though 
education in Ukraine was scarce outside of the increasingly Russified nobility, the 
Ukrainian language was not taught out of fear of its subversive nature. This political and 
cultural repression served to strengthen Ukrainian nationalism even in the face of 
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attempts to Russify the greater populace, although such efforts were limited only to the 
last two Tsars and had limited success due to several centuries of cultural development 
and poor education.129 
A counterbalance to any Ukrainian nationalism was also the budding Pan-Slavic 
movement in the flowering of nationalism in Russia of the 19th century. Its multi-faceted 
perceptions and diverse agendas hurt and helped Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. The 
Decembrist uprising in 1825 and the suppression of the Polish rebellion in 1830 by 
Tsarist forces split the forces of Pan-Slavism into pro-Russian and anti-Russian camps.130 
Leftist Pan-Slavists pursued a Slavic Federation free of the European and Russian 
dynastic ancien régimes; this policy was clear in the first Pan-Slavic congress in Prague 
in 1848. In contrast, pro-Russian Pan-Slavism swung right with its dynastic foundation 
and transformed into the concept of a “Slavic Civilization” with Russia as its great 
protector. This idea portrayed the Germans and the Austrians as the eternal opponents of 
the Slavs and strengthened Russian nationalism, state centrism, and imperialism in the 
course of the 19th century in the face of German unification and the decline of the 
Habsburg Empire.131 
Ukrainians under Russian rule experienced a deliberate and coordinated effort to 
undermine the development of a Ukrainian national identity because Ukraine was unlike 
other Russian territories. “Poland, Finland, and other borderlands did not give Russia her 
greatness” but Ukraine did.132 The evolution under the Habsburgs resulted in something 
quite different. 
3. Ruthenians 
The decline of medieval Poland and rise of Habsburg Austrian power in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in Vienna’s rule of both Poles and 
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Ukrainians—called Ruthenians under Austria’s rule of lands acquired in the partitions of 
Poland. Habsburg Ruthenians experienced an oblique evolution as they followed 
different paths in the same direction: trying to distinguish themselves from Poles where 
Romanov Ukrainians struggled to distinguish themselves from Russians.133 The 
Ruthenian nationalist movement in Habsburg Ukraine, particularly in the region of 
Galicia, had a mainly linguistic driving force, in addition to cultural and intellectual 
variables. Linguists such as Ivan Mohylnytsky (1777–1831) maintained that the 
Ukrainian language was a separate language equal in standing to Czech, Polish, and 
Russian, instead of merely a dialect.134 This idea created a cultural struggle because Poles 
viewed the Ukrainian peasantry as their historical right and obligation to civilize: they did 
not recognize Ukraine or Ukrainians, only a “pitiful type of Pole.”135 Such an attitude 
proved inflammatory in the 18th century when the Habsburg crown favored Poles to rule 
in Galicia.136 Habsburg Emperor Joseph II’s political and social reforms made 
elementary schooling in vernacular languages mandatory in 1781, in contrast to the 
Romanovs’ less developed education programs. However, even though the Habsburg 
system allowed for schooling in the “Slaveno-Rusyn” language—the predecessor of 
modern Ukrainian—upward mobility was limited.137 In Galicia, Polish rulers offered 
Polonization—assimilation into Polish culture—as the only options for Ruthenians.138 
Higher education was offered only in Polish or German, so the small Ruthenian elite was 
quickly stratified into Polonophiles or Ruthenian (i.e. Ukrainian) nationalists, with most 
choosing the former.139 A third option for Ruthenians was to adopt the Habsburg 
dynastic Austrian-German identity—like the famous author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch 
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(1836–1895).140 Such a choice was common under Habsburg rule in the nations of the 
various crown lands. 
Despite this fragmenting effect, Ruthenians in Galicia established a rather stalwart 
national identity by the turn of the 19th century. Many members of the Ruthenian-
Galician elite saw themselves as one nation split between two empires—although a 
number of the Eastern Orthodox clerical hierarchy saw “their kinsmen in the east” as a 
separate nation due to the preponderance of Russian Orthodoxy.141 Clashing nationalistic 
sentiments between Galician Poles and Ruthenians in the revolutions of 1848 led the 
Ruthenians to declare to the Austrian Minister of the Interior that “Poles and Ruthenians, 
it is clear, cannot live together in peace,” in a request to partition Galicia.142 This friction 
between nationalities and nations would endure and result in a resolute local nationalism 
that distinguished the Ruthenians from the Poles by the turn of the century; however, the 
imperial borders that created “two nationalities on one ethnographic base” would crumble 
with their empires after World War I.143 
4. Struggle for National Statehood 
The modern state of Ukraine was a product of World War I and the dissolution of 
the empires that had ruled it. Ukrainians were not referred to as such until their official 
independence was won in 1918. Since Ukraine had been invaded by Imperial German 
forces, Ukraine was able to gain its independence from Soviet Russia via the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk. As previously mentioned, however, the national movement leading up to 
this point was not only fractured between two distinctly different groups of people but 
also almost exclusively confined to the elites that sought to further their socio-political 
agendas. According to an unnamed British diplomat in 1918, “were one to ask the 
average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek 
Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or a Ukrainian, he 
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would probably reply that he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language 
he spoke, he would say that he talked ‘the local tongue.’”144 
After the Bolsheviks’ October 1917 coup in Petrograd overthrew the Provisional 
Government, the Ukrainian Central Rada struggled to defend itself from Bolshevik 
forces. Originally “little more than a coordinating committee of Ukrainophile political 
and cultural organizations,” the Central Rada became the parliamentary body of 
Ukraine.145 In January 1918, the Central Rada declared Ukraine’s independence in order 
to secure a peace treaty with Hohenzollern Germany and Habsburg Austria for protection 
from invading Bolsheviks.146 The Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) was a 
“Hetmanate” government that sought to establish a Ukrainian state close to modern 
Ukrainian borders, excluding Crimea and Western Galicia. The UNR claimed to 
represent the Ukrainian people despite the absence of any elected officials or a widely 
shared concept of Ukrainian identity.147 Although a national flag, currency, and language 
were established, there was still a distinct internal division over language. Moreover, 
several political forces were contending within the borders—including Poles, supporters 
of both the Red and the White factions of the Russian Civil War, and anarchists. The 
Ukrainian nationalists had the weakest grasp on the country. Unable to organize its own 
military, the UNR secured military alliances with Germany and Austria in exchange for 
grain to feed their armies. After forcing out the Bolsheviks, the Germans dissolved the 
Rada out of fear of its socialist character and installed a leader that favored the land-
owning class. The armistice signed on November 11, 1918, however, meant the 
withdrawal of the German and Austrian troops and the renewed vulnerability of 
Ukraine.148 
Following the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War and the Soviet 
consolidation of power in 1921, Ukraine lost its short-lived independence and was 
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reintegrated with Russia under Soviet auspices. The Ukrainian independence movement 
during the civil war and Ukrainian support for the invading Kaiser’s armies in World War 
I, however, were not forgotten by Soviet leaders.149 Although devastating throughout the 
Soviet Union, Stalin’s collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s was “clearly 
premeditated mass murder on the scale of millions” in Soviet Ukraine.150 Attempting to 
eliminate the kulak class—affluent landlord farmers—Stalin sent 1.7 million Soviet 
citizens to the Gulag, and 300,000 of them were Ukrainian.151 Furthermore, the “terror 
famine” brought on by state requisitioning and sealed borders would kill between six and 
eleven million Ukrainians.152 Any peasant resistance was quashed viciously by Soviet 
agencies to ensure that no Mazepist tendencies could be fomented. 
In addition, the Ukrainian capital was also shifted from the eastern city of Kharkiv 
to Kyiv, not necessarily to further suppress an already defeated nationalist movement but 
to create a new bastion of the Soviet proletariat in the heart of Ukraine and the cradle of 
Russian civilization. This would eventually backfire as the intelligentsia established a 
post-war cultural and civilizational symbol in the traditional Ukrainian capital as peasants 
were migrating to urban areas.153 
Moreover, Soviet post-World War II policies concerning Ukraine would further 
contribute to an already existential rift in the population. The Ukrainian lands of the 
former Russian Empire were heavily Russified with the mass resettlement of ethnic 
Russians, thanks in part to the generally more Russophilic attitude of eastern Ukrainians, 
or “Little Russians.” In contrast, after the annexation of Western Ukrainian territories in 
1940–1941 and 1944–1945 there was no resettlement of Russians to those lands. As 
Ukrainian nationalists in the west resisted Soviet occupation, hundreds of thousands were 
killed or deported; and the area was heavily policed by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
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Bezopasnosti (KGB) to prevent resurgent nationalism; however, no mass Russification 
occurred.154 Southern and eastern Ukraine—particularly the industrial Donbas region—
became a “multi-ethnic melting pot for all the peoples of the Empire” with a distinctly 
Russian culture.155 
Concurrently, the Western Ukrainians’ deep-seated hostility toward Russia 
continued to develop well into the 20th century. A Ukrainian nationalist movement 
smoldered through the 1960s and 1970s in Kiev, with several leaders imprisoned and sent 
to labor camps. Although the movement met with fervent Soviet opposition, Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s Perestroika reforms allowed for Popular Fronts and advocacy for the 
Ukrainian language through the 1980s. This contributed to the eventual disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of Ukraine and other former Soviet 
republics in 1991.156 
As the Soviet Union collapsed and independence referenda were held in the 
Soviet Socialist Republics, it quickly became evident that Boris Yeltsin’s concept of 
independence as “each republic [having] sovereignty, but we would all remain together” 
was not endorsed by Ukraine and other Soviet successor states.157 On August 24, 1991, 
the Ukrainian SSR voted 346 to 1 for independence and in a December 1, 1991 
referendum the people voted 90.3 percent for independence. Boris Yeltsin exclaimed, 
“What, even the Donbas voted yes?”158 As the post-Soviet Ukrainian political structure 
formed in the 1990s it was still evident, though, that the divisions persisted. An informal 
coalition of Ukrainian Nationalists based in Western Galicia and “corporate lobbies and 
local barons” dominate the right-center and see internal Ukrainian divisions as unnatural. 
In their view, ethnic Russians are “colonists” or “denationalized Ukrainians…separated 
from their native tongue and culture by forcible policies of ‘Russification.’”159 
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Meanwhile, the Sovietized populations of the south and east maintained a “destructive 
opposition” in the left—although officially outlawed until 1993.160 The presidential 
elections of the next fifteen years proved to be a stark representation of the internal divide 
in Ukraine as voting results showed a clear East/West divide; the candidates’ policies 
see-sawed accordingly between pro-European and pro-Russian themes.161 
Ukrainian history has undergone several transformations. A borderland between 
different cultural and civilizational zones, it has seen its own proto-kingdom in the 
Kievan Rus, been under the control of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and ruled 
by a minority Cossack Hetmanate only to come under the reign of several states in a 
relatively short period of time in the 18th to 20th centuries.162 Historians have portrayed 
Ukraine as the progenitor of Russian civilization, replaced its early modern history with 
that of the Cossacks, and depicted it as a multi-ethnic realm descended from the Rus.163 
In contrast to what Renan considers “getting history wrong,” Ukraine’s history is rather 
that of a borderland between Eastern Europe and the Asian steppes it has spent its past 
shifting between.164 Nonetheless, a peninsula that has been only recently associated with 
Ukraine has become a fulcrum between the geopolitical forces that Ukraine has been 
dealing with throughout its history as a “gateway state.”165 
B. CRIMEAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The Crimean Peninsula has been described by students of strategy as “the next 
Bosnia,” “a new Nagorny Karabakh,” and even “Kashmir.”166 It is the historical 
homeland of the now-minority Crimean Tatars and a symbol of their national identity. To 
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Russians it was the warm water port for access to the Mediterranean, the “jewel in the 
crown of the empire,” and a site of former military glory—although glorious defeat.167 
Ukrainians regard it as the “Cossacks’ outlet to the sea” and within the sovereign borders 
internationally agreed upon.168 The symbolic and strategic value of the peninsula has 
made it a historically contested territory between several groups. When Ukraine achieved 
independence from the USSR in 1991 with the peninsula included, Crimea became a key 
aspect of Ukrainian-Russian foreign relations. 
1. From Batu Khan to Brest-Litovsk 
Invaded in the 13th century by the Mongolian Golden Horde of Batu Khan—the 
same that sacked Kiev in 1240—Crimea was inhabited by Greek and Italian trading 
colonies and nomadic peoples of the Eastern steppes.169 During the period of Mongol 
rule, Turkic nomads of the European and Asiatic steppe called Tatars started settling in 
Crimea. These Tatars established their own Khanate state as the Mongol empire 
crumbled around it in the 1420s, maintaining autonomy until the Ottoman conquest in 
1475.170 Under Ottoman rule, the Crimean Tatar Khanate developed a trade economy 
based primarily on the slave trade, sourced by annual forays into the Slavic lands to the 
north.171 The peninsula became the stage of a struggle for the next several centuries as 
the Ottomans repulsed attacks from the Poles and Russians who vied for the strategic 
territory until Crimea was eventually annexed by Catherine the Great after a successful 
invasion in 1783 as part of the imperial expansion that is so central to the Russian sense 
of identity. Upon her conquest, the peninsula was ethnographically divided between the 
littoral communities whose Greek and Italian trading companies reflected their 
Mediterranean heritage, and the nomadic herding cultures of the Tatars, who closely 
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resembled their Mongol and Ottoman progenitors. The Tatars had also overwhelmingly 
adopted the Islamic religion of their Ottoman rulers. Centuries of conflict with Tatar 
raiders and the Ottoman Empire manifested itself in a particularly oppressive Russian 
occupation. The recently de-feudalized Christian Russians also had a different concept of 
land ownership than the Islamic nomads and land was seized by Russian settlers.172 
Despite the difficulties of populating Crimea with Russian settlers due to the remoteness 
of the peninsula, it marked the first of several waves of Tatar emigration during Russian 
occupation, mainly to the lands of their ethnographic kin in the Ottoman Empire.173 
300,000 Tatars left Crimea following Catherine’s annexation in the 18th century, 30,000 
more did so during the Russo-Turkish War of 1807–1811, and a further 230,000 did so 
after the Crimean War in 1853–1856.174 These conflicts led Russians to a deep distrust of 
the Tatar population based on their Ottoman heritage.175 By the turn of the century, the 
Tatars were only one-third of the Crimean population and the demographic shift 
continued to their disadvantage throughout the 19th century.176 
2. Transition to Soviet Rule and World War II 
As a result of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in January 1918, Crimea was included in 
the territory of the briefly independent Ukraine recognized by the Central Powers, but, 
once these nations were defeated in November 1918, the Bolsheviks quickly re-annexed 
Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1921 after the Russian Civil War.177 The Crimean 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) existed from 1921 to 1946, during which 
time Russian settlers continued to flow to the peninsula. Nevertheless, Tatar national 
identity was encouraged by Lenin’s regime as a part of his “Great Friendship of Nations,” 
and this played a pivotal role in developing a nationalist character in an increasingly 
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secularized population.178 The 1937 census recorded 47.7 percent of the Crimean 
population as Russian, 20.7 percent Tatar, and 12.8 percent Ukrainian,179 but World War 
II and its aftermath at the hands of Joseph Stalin would change this population 
distribution. 
Nazi and Romanian forces invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, and Crimea 
was to play a vital part in their strategy. Sevastopol was a strategic port city. Taking it 
would not only deprive the Soviets of their naval presence in the Black Sea and their 
access to the Mediterranean, but would also provide logistic support for the Nazi invasion 
of Russia. The siege of the city and the campaign on the Crimea were costly operations. 
As many as 20,000 Tatars fought in the Soviet forces defending the peninsula, and 
seventeen percent of the partisans that resisted Nazi rule after the invasion were Tatars. 
Nevertheless, as did other subject nationalities in the Soviet realm, many Tatar leaders 
welcomed the Nazis and other Axis powers as liberators from an oppressive Soviet 
rule.180 Nazi occupation also resulted in the brutal persecution of some of the peninsula’s 
other ethnic minorities, including the Turkic-speaking Krymchak Jews. Despite the far 
from universal Tatar support for the Nazi and Romanian occupiers, Joseph Stalin revoked 
the status of the Tatars as a recognized minority in the Soviet Union and ordered the 
cleansing of the Crimean ASSR of “anti-Soviet elements.”181 
In May 1944, mechanized divisions of the NKVD182 loaded between 150,000 and 
190,000 Crimean Tatars onto trains and relocated them to special settlements in the 
Central Asian steppes, primarily Eastern Uzbekistan.183 The Crimean ASSR was 
abolished in 1946 and annexed by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR), and Moscow began encouraging Russians to once more repopulate the vacated 
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lands and properties.184 In effect, the Soviets ensured that there was no significant ethnic 
entity on the peninsula other than Russians and Ukrainian “Little Russians.” In 1954, 
however, a relatively peculiar and seemingly inconsequential act by Soviet leaders would 
have major ramifications. 
The Crimean Oblast that had been a part of the RSFSR since 1946 was transferred 
to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1954. Although there is little 
documentation about the impetus for the transfer, it was justified as a gift to Ukraine in 
celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, when Hetman 
Khmelnytsky declared allegiance to the Russian Empire. It is clear that the transfer was 
initiated at the highest levels of leadership, because it took the form of an agreement 
between the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. When the city councils of Simferopol 
and Sevastopol were consulted, there was no dissenting voice. The transfer was regarded 
as an internal administrative affair, a transfer within a state without significant political or 
economic impact. Furthermore, the documentation cited “common economic [interests] 
and territorial proximity” and “close economic and cultural links between the Crimean 
Oblast and Ukraine.”185 Despite these motivations, there had been no Ukrainian 
autonomism or self-determination initiative in 1954, and regardless of the territory 
officially being a part of Ukraine, relatively few Ukrainians settled there. The majority of 
Soviet settlers were ethnic Russians from either Russia or Ukraine.186 The stunning 
beauty and warm beaches of the Crimean Peninsula resulted in its transition in the 1950s 
to an “All-Union Resort” and popular vacation destination for Soviet citizens. The 
substantial military presence in Sevastopol also contributed to Crimea becoming a 
retirement locale for high-ranking, mostly Russian, Soviet officers.187 The heavy 
Russification of Crimea—that started in 1783 and accelerated after 1944—defined the 
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demographic composition that would be influential during the transition to democracy 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
3. Transition to Independence 
The 1980s and 1990s were a tumultuous and multifaceted time for Crimea as 
Gorbachev’s reforms allowed the return of the deported minorities amid multiple 
referenda for independence as the Soviet Union fractured into its composite pieces. In 
1989, Russians made up more than two-thirds of the population in Crimea, Ukrainians 
just over one-quarter, and Crimean Tatars only one and one-half percent.188 Furthermore, 
almost half of the Ukrainians spoke primarily Russian, meaning that 83 percent of the 
populace used Russian as their first language.189 This ethnic makeup proved confusing 
and difficult for domestic and international policy-makers to agree upon as post-Soviet 
borders and politics took form. Crimeans seemed split and confused regarding their own 
destiny as well. In response to the question, “Are you for the restoration of the Crimean 
ASSR as a subject of the USSR and a party to the Union Treaty?” over 93 percent voted 
in favor and the Crimean Autonomous Republic was restored within the boundaries of 
the Ukrainian SSR in February 1991.190 Ten months later, however, 54.1 percent voted in 
favor of Ukrainian independence.191 Although this is as shocking as the Donbas’s August 
1991 vote for independence, it should be noted that Crimea was the only province in the 
Ukrainian SSR that did not achieve an absolute majority of the populace (considering that 
there was only a 60 percent voter turnout).192 As Ukraine became an independent state, 
however, there was strife on the peninsula, notably when Ukrainian was deemed the 
official language. Crimea declared itself independent in 1992 and Sevastopol declared 
itself a Russian Federal City and the stronghold of the Black Sea fleet thanks to the 
overwhelming Russian loyalty of the officer corps.193 As a response, Kiev gave Crimea 
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significant autonomy with regard to language, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
condemned the declaration by Sevastopol and other Russian separatist claims in order not 
to separate the city from the peninsula.194 Despite Yeltsin’s stance, Russian politicians 
were divided on the issue at the time. Even liberal Russians like Anatoliy Sobchak, then 
the Mayor of St. Petersburg, urged the repeal of the 1954 transfer. Aleksandr Rutskoi, 
then the Russian Vice-President, spearheaded the movement to “restore” Crimea to 
Russia.195 Russian delegate Nikolai Pavlov declared in a January 1992 speech in 
Sevastopol that “Crimea was never Ukrainian and never will be; it was, and remains, 
Russian.”196 
The return of deported peoples further complicated the issue. Starting with 
Gorbachev’s social reforms in the 1980s, the minorities that had been deported or had 
emigrated over the last century started to return. The “deported peoples” included 
Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Krymchaks, and Karaims, with the largest 
group being Crimean Tatars.197 Returning peoples formed squatter camps and had 
frequent clashes with local authorities as a result of anti-Tatar prejudices in daily life as 
well as in the political realm.198 Such clashes continued through the 1990s and persist to 
the present. Thousands of Tatars protested the celebration of Catherine’s 1783 annexation 
of Crimea in 1999. Two people were killed in protests following the seizure of the 
Crimean Parliament building in February 2014 when pro-Russian crowds clashed with 
pro-Ukrainian Tatars.199 By the mid-1990s, the Crimean Tatar population in Crimea had 
increased three-fold to more than 250,000 inhabitants.200  
The severe downturn of the Ukrainian economy disenchanted many on the 
Crimean Peninsula with the Ukrainian government. It also brought into stark realization 
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the fact that Crimea’s dependence on the Ukrainian infrastructure had developed 
dramatically in the decades since the 1954 transfer.201 Crimea received 80 percent of its 
water, 75 percent of its industrial goods, and 85 percent of its energy from Ukraine.202 
Furthermore, the socioeconomic divide between the population caused little strife 
between the Russian and Ukrainian inhabitants, but Crimean Tatars constituted 70 
percent of the unemployed populace and their financial hardships caused further 
marginalization.203 
Minority populations in Crimea viewed the Ukrainian Government as the 
“guarantor of their cultural and political rights” and opposed Crimean separatism or 
reintegration into Russia.204 In 1994, however, Ukraine accepted the removal of Soviet-
made nuclear weapons from its soil in order to guarantee its territorial borders.205 The 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994 invoked the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Accords 
regarding the “territorial integrity of states,”206 and the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States agreed to “respect the independence and sovereignty and 
the existing borders of Ukraine” and “reaffirm[ed] their obligation to refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, 
and [to ensure] that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in 
self-defence.”207 Although perceived by Russian nationalists as an integral part of 
Russian identity of great strategic value, Crimea was always treated as a matter of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations that was lightly treaded upon in order not to strain links 
between the two states.208 The Russians viewed Crimea as a “useful stick with which to 
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beat the Ukrainian Republic,”209 and it was in the new millennium that Russia would 
wield it. 
C. BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS OF THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
Crimea’s role as a strategic issue in Ukrainian-Russian foreign relations in 
contemporary history stepped from the political discourse and rhetoric of the 20th and 
early 21st centuries into the realm of military intervention when further Russian troops 
started appearing in Crimea in 2014. The invasion and subsequent annexation were a 
direct corollary of events in Kiev and the culmination of more than a decade of tense 
political relations between Russia and Ukraine amid a revolution as Ukraine swung back 
and forth between Russia and the West. The events of the Orange Revolution in 2004, the 
possibility of NATO membership evoked by the NATO Allies at the Bucharest Summit 
in 2008, potential trade agreements with the European Union rejected by President 
Yanukovych in November 2013, and his subsequent ouster in February 2014 directly led 
to overt Russian military involvement on Ukrainian soil in violation of the respect for 
territorial integrity promised in 1994. 
1. Fraud and Revolution 
The dramatic shift of Ukrainian politics in 2004 as a result of the Orange 
Revolution marked a sea change in Russian-Ukrainian relations that would start a 
struggle between pro-European Union and pro-Russian forces over the next decade. On 
November 21, 2004, nonpartisan exit polls showed the pro-European reformist Viktor 
Yushchenko ahead of the Eastern-Ukrainian-native and pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych 
52 percent to 43 percent, respectively. When the official results were released the next 
morning, Yanukovych had miraculously won by a margin of 2.5 percent.210 The 
preceding campaign was already marred with controversy as Yushchenko was poisoned 
with dioxin a few months earlier, and had been denied landing clearances at airports 
before rallies. Moreover, crowds of thousands of voters wielding multiple absentee 
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ballots were observed going from polling station to polling station.211 A growing middle 
class in Ukrainian cities and drastic developments in civil society helped by U.S. and 
European governments, NGOs, and private philanthropists in the early 2000s resulted in a 
strong liberal opposition that quickly mobilized.212 Yushchenko declared widespread 
fraud, convened a snap meeting in parliament, and had himself sworn in as president. 
This created a confused situation, with an outgoing incumbent president (Leonid 
Kuchma), a nominal winner in the contested elections (Viktor Yanukovych), and the 
supposedly popular choice (Viktor Yushchenko).213 Days of protest followed, the 
protesters swaddled in orange clothing and waving orange banners—the color of 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party—that gave the movement the moniker of the Orange 
Revolution. On November 27, 2004, the cabinet, standing president Leonid Kuchma, and 
the parliament declared the runoff invalid and six days later, the Supreme Court annulled 
the elections. The next month, under heavy international monitoring, new elections were 
held and Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote, with a marked regional division.214 
Despite heavy support from Russian President Putin via lengthy press conferences and 
several hundred million dollars to Yanukovych, Yushchenko was elected president and 
voiced a strong dedication to a democratic Ukraine and closer ties to the European 
Union.215 
The ensuing years featured strife between Russia and Ukraine. Several disputes 
over the price of energy supplied by Russian-owned Gazprom and outstanding Ukrainian 
debts started shortly after the 2004 elections.216 Relations were further strained in 2008 at 
the NATO Bucharest Summit, because Georgia and Ukraine sought NATO membership 
and the NATO Allies declared that “these countries will become members of NATO.”217 
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In a press conference with President Yushchenko during a visit to the Kremlin prior to 
the summit, President Putin threatened to “target its missile systems at Ukraine” if 
Ukraine joined the NATO alliance and agreed to the positioning of a missile defense 
system on Ukrainian soil.218 At the summit, although the NATO Allies welcomed the 
“Euro-Atlantic aspirations” of Georgia and Ukraine, no Membership Action Plan was 
offered. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko stated that day that 
“Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake that 
would have the most serious consequences for pan-European security.”219 Within 
months, Russian troops were fighting in Georgia, ostensibly to protect Russian citizens in 
the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.220 Russian fears of further pro-
European Union ambitions in Ukraine would be diminished in 2010, though, with the 
election of Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency. 
Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency proved less than successful. His administration 
was troubled by public political clashes with his Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, and 
a reeling economy owing to the global financial crisis that began in 2008. Yushchenko’s 
old opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, this time ran on a pro-democratic platform, claiming 
that although the Orange Revolution had been “to weaken Russia,” it was a popular call 
for democracy and that he had learned from the mistakes of 2004.221 This was absolutely 
correct: employing what Western analysts described as “anti-democratic” means, 
Yanukovych was able to change the parliament’s laws regarding political coalitions and 
won the presidential elections without outright fraud.222 Although he was able to block 
Ukraine’s movement toward NATO membership in 2010, Yanukovych’s indecision 
about whether to sign a EU Association Agreement would be his undoing. 
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The agreement, which promised to promote “democracy and the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, a market economy 
and sustainable development” by “focus[ing] on core economic and political reforms,”223 
met with heavy resistance from Russia. Putin had promised Yanukovych a $15 billion 
loan if Ukraine joined a nascent Eurasian Customs Union in lieu of the EU agreement.224 
If Yanukovych had accepted the offer, he would have had to rebrand himself as an “anti-
Western autocrat with a political future bound to Russia.”225 He would not have the 
opportunity to rebrand himself, however. Upon rejecting the EU agreement, small 
protests started on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev. The 
protests quickly gained momentum and eventually government forces were sent to quell 
the uprising, resulting in 100 deaths between the two sides.226 As government forces 
drew down resistance for fear of provoking a wider rebellion, President Yanukovych fled 
the country on February 21, 2014, and appeared days later in Russia.227 Prior to fleeing, 
however, Yanukovych officially invited Russian military forces to help stabilize Ukraine, 
even though the Ukrainian Constitution only permits the parliament to make such 
invitations.228 The Ukrainian Parliament impeached Yanukovych and installed an interim 
government until elections could be held.229  
2. “Little Green Men” and a Referendum 
President Putin denounced the impeachment as an “unconstitutional coup” and 
refused to acknowledge any prior agreements with Ukraine, including the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum.230 One week later, soldiers in plain green uniforms and balaclavas 
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appeared throughout Crimea and surrounded Ukrainian military installations. Despite the 
soldiers’ accents, weaponry, training, and blatant acts in the interest of military 
intelligence units of the Russian Federation, Putin refused to acknowledge that these 
troops without insignia were Russian or had received any training or weapons from the 
Russian Federation. Although widely recognized throughout the world as Russian forces, 
they were called “local self-defense units” by President Putin.231 Following the 
appearance of what the Crimeans called “Little Green Men,” local gunmen seized the 
Crimean Parliament and held several closed sessions, barring and dismissing many 
representatives. The Ukrainian military was ordered not to fire on or provoke the Russian 
forces in order to avoid further Russian involvement.232 After appointing Sergei 
Aksenov—a pro-Russian politician—as the head of the Crimean government, Crimea 
declared independence from Ukraine and requested incorporation into the Russian 
Federation on March 11.233 
Within the week, irredentist efforts staged a referendum for the secession of 
Crimea on March 16. The referendum did not offer a choice to maintain the status quo, 
presenting only two options: “reunification with Russia,” and “increased autonomy under 
the 1992 Crimean constitution.” Furthermore, the presence of armed soldiers in the 
streets, the boycott of the referendum by several minorities (notably the Crimean Tatars), 
and the intimidation of Ukrainian and Crimean minorities resulted in the condemnation of 
the referendum by 100 of the 193 members of the United Nations in a General Assembly 
vote on March 27, 2014. Conflicting results added to the illegitimacy of the referendum, 
with official results claiming an 83.1 percent voter turnout and 96.77 percent voting in 
favor of “reunification,” even though the Russian President’s Council on Civil Society 
and Human Rights published a 30 percent turnout with roughly 50 percent in favor of 
“reunification.”234 As noted earlier, a majority in the United Nations General Assembly 
condemned the referendum and military intervention in Crimea, but Russia’s status as a 
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permanent member of the UN Security Council meant that the UNSC was powerless.235 
On March 18, 2014, representatives from Crimea and Sevastopol signed a treaty for the 
accession of Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation with 
President Putin and other Russian representatives. Putin’s speech repeated many of the 
Russian claims and narratives regarding the crisis. Two days later, the Russian 
Constitutional Court ratified the treaty.236 
In the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea, reports of human rights 
violations were abundant. After declaring that all Ukrainian citizens legally residing in 
Crimea and Sevastopol were Russian citizens, Moscow announced that all residents who 
did not hold a Russian passport were considered aliens.237 During the course of the 
occupation, the Russian Federation and the ruling Crimean government silenced all 
Ukrainian-language television broadcasts and stopped all instruction in the Ukrainian 
language in the 600 schools that offered it.238 Those who oppose the annexation have 
been harassed and threatened, along with journalists. Furthermore, Tatar public leaders 
have been exiled from the peninsula for refusing to acknowledge Russian authority. In 
anticipation of the commemoration of the 1944 deportations of the Crimean Tatars, the 
authorities also pre-emptively banned any public gatherings.239 The daily harassment of 
dissenters and the high rate of emigration240 are likely to ensure further Russification and 
waning dissent on the peninsula. 
“Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one 
of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing Russian military glory and outstanding 
valour,” Putin remarked in his March 18, 2014 speech at the Kremlin.241 The speech rang 
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with the rhetoric that preceded the invasion and persisted following it. Utilizing Tsarist 
terms like Novorossiia to refer to Ukrainian lands, Putin emphasized the Russian 
character of the peninsula and the historic landmarks sacred to Russia. Going back in 
history to reference the baptism of Prince Volodymyr—the Grand Prince of Kiev and 
ruler of the Kieven Rus—as the cultural link that unites Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, 
Putin lauded Russian military glory and lamented the downfall of the Soviet Union. Putin 
condemned the personal initiative of the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev when he 
“handed over [Crimea] like a sack of potatoes.”242 Considering the human rights 
violations that followed the annexation of Crimea, it was ironic that Putin acknowledged 
that Tatars had been “treated unfairly” like many other ethnic groups in the USSR and 
pledged to support the reestablishment of the Tatar diaspora.243 Despite Putin’s claims 
that Moscow’s motive was to protect the Russian minorities in Crimea and Putin’s 
reference to the invitation to use force by Yanukovych and the Crimean Parliament, 
grander geopolitical narratives regarding the invasion surfaced. Putin voiced concerns 
over an expanding NATO creating “not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole 
of southern Russia”244 and invoked a terrifying narrative familiar to Russians: invasion 
from the West. The Russians employed terms like “Nazi,” “neo-Nazi,” “fascist,” and 
“junta” to describe the revolutionary forces of the Euromaidan and its supporting 
agencies. Putin’s March 18, 2014, speech and the state-controlled Russian media 
reinforced the propaganda theme of the threat of a fascist invasion from the West that is 
common in the vernacular of some post-Soviet societies.245 Putin’s speech and the 
subsequent Kremlin doctrine and rhetoric concerning Russian intervention in Crimea 
essentially disregard the existence of a valid Ukrainian national concept and relapse into 
Tsarist and imperialist language, claiming Russian historic rights to the territory. 
Nevertheless, the strategic relevance of the peninsula regarding a perceived threat from 
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NATO enlargement reveals Russia’s geopolitical gains from denying Ukraine potential 
entry into the Alliance. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 clearly resulted from President 
Putin’s Russia pursuing a revanchist and irredentist agenda. Crimea and the Federal City 
of Sevastopol are framed as henceforth and eternally Russian territories to be reunified 
with the motherland after the separation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
While Russia considers other former Soviet republics with Russian-speaking 
minorities—such as the Baltic States and Georgia—as within its sphere of interest, 
Ukraine is deemed vital to Russia’s own national identity. The 1954 transfer of Crimea to 
Ukraine was not detrimental to the USSR’s strategic interests in an era when Ukraine’s 
loyalty to Moscow was undisputed. The patent rift in social and national identity within 
Ukraine, a legacy of its rule by different imperial powers, produced a Ukrainian national 
movement that threatened to drag its future path away from Russia. In annexing Crimea, 
Russia has managed to bar Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which Moscow considers to be 
an existential threat, while at the same time regaining full control over its strategic naval 
bases in the Black Sea. The Russian majority and simmering separatist movements made 
the coup de main relatively smooth and bloodless. Although the referendum’s validity 
and the legality of the annexation are contested by 100 of the member states of the United 
Nations, with a degree of isolation for the Russian Federation, the annexation is a fait 
accompli.246 
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IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
HITLER ANALOGY 
A. WEIMAR RUSSIA? 
Parallels between Russia and Germany did not start being drawn only after the 
Russo-Ukrainian energy disputes in 2005–2009, the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the 
Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, or the War in Donbass since 2014. Shortly after 
the fall of the Soviet Union and advent of the democratic Russian Federation, scholars 
and journalists identified likenesses between the young Russian democracy and the ill-
fated Weimar Republic of Germany whose collapse resulted in Adolf Hitler’s fascist 
dictatorship. Experts began preparing scholarly analyses of these young democracies 
prior to the rise of Vladimir Putin. Far from establishing any consensus on the similarities 
or their implications, the comparisons were frequently “left at the level of an interesting 
remark.”247 The recently humiliated and politically unstable state with a limited 
democratic culture could easily slip into authoritarianism. Analyses ranged from concerns 
that Russia would quickly adopt another tyranny after casting one off, to reflection on the 
difficulty young democracies face without established norms, to discussions of neo-
imperialist Russian politicians.248 Despite the speculative nature of some analyses, the 
comparison was illustrative and informative as to certain striking similarities. Experts can 
point out the implications of weak democratic norms and institutions in formerly 
powerful states with strong national histories and inform policymakers without jumping 
to sweeping and ill-informed analogies. 
The conspicuous similarities between the newly democratized countries were 
numerous and identifiable. The myth of an internal enemy that weakened the prospects of 
the nation from the inside persisted in both cases: Jews and capitalists in Weimar 
Germany, a clique of reformers funded by foreigners in Russia.249 A newly estranged 
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diaspora of ethnic nationals across borders evoked an inevitable revisionist and 
revanchist contingent within both former empires: Alsace-Lorraine, the Sudetenland, 
Austria, and Poland for Weimar Germany, and the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia for the Russian Federation.250 While the Weimar 
Republic battled the rising Communists and Social Democrats on the left and German 
Nationalists and National Socialists on the right, Russia dealt with resurgent ex-
Communists and nationalist parties.251 The weight of these similarities, however 
disturbing and apt, diminishes when examined in a richer historical context. 
The late 1990s analysis of the analogy by Hanson and Kopstein appears optimistic 
in retrospect. They cited continued East/West partnership and the lack of a financial crisis 
as promising indicators.252 Setbacks in NATO-Russia relations owing to events such as 
the Kosovo conflict in 1998–1999 exacerbated and empowered Russian revisionism. 
Paradoxically, public support has galvanized behind Putin despite economic hardship. 
What Ivan Krastev called the “paradox of New Authoritarianism” resulted in a 
consolidation of power without extreme autocratic methods: open borders allow political 
dissidents to emigrate and the lack of a strict and coherent ideology denies the opposition 
an easy target for criticism.253 As Hanson points out, though, Putin’s lack of an 
overarching ideology has resulted in an “odd, hollow quality” to his presidential 
authoritarianism.254 To compare the myth of an internal enemy in Weimar Germany and 
post-Soviet Russia is disproportionate and lopsided. Hitler’s pursuit of what he perceived 
to be internal enemies was central to his genocidal policies. Putin’s intimidation and 
elimination of political opposition and restriction of human rights pales in scope when 
compared to Hitler’s behavior. The path away from liberal democracy in Russia has thus 
far resulted in an authoritarian regime focused on the consolidation of power 
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domestically and the pursuit of strategic interests in Russia’s near-abroad: moves in a 
zero-sum game to regain the global influence of yesteryear.255 Relatively modest 
international resistance and heavy indifference toward the former superpower’s status as 
a permanent member on the U.N. Security Council have resulted in Russian revisionism 
and resistance in the guise of revanchism for the sake of public support at home.256 
Richard Sakwa has observed that any comparison should be “tempered by the fact that 
the world of the 1990s and 2000s is a very different one from that of the 1920s or 
1930s.”257 Human rights legislation, more robust international institutions, and economic 
interdependence “raise the threshold of toleration that extremist reaction would have to 
negotiate.”258 
The deterministic nature of the Weimar Russia comparison in the 1990s was to 
some degree erroneous, although forecasts of Russia’s descent into a presidential 
authoritarianism were vindicated by events. Nevertheless, the comparisons fall flat when 
the implications are drawn out beyond the potential of young post-imperial democracies 
to relapse in to authoritarianism. Although the “Weimar Russia” analogy declined in 
popularity at the turn of the millennium, events in the 2000s would invoke another 
similar comparison. 
B. REDUCTIO AD HITLERUM 
Following the appearance of Russian forces in Crimea and the ensuing 
annexation, several public figures made explicit comparisons to Hitler’s effort to unite 
the Reich with the German-speaking peoples of Austria and the Sudetenland. Prince 
Charles remarked to a World War II Polish refugee that Hitler’s invasion of bordering 
countries was “not unlike…what Putin is doing.”259 Former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton commented on Putin’s actions in Crimea as follows: “Now if this sounds 
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familiar, it’s what Hitler did back in the ‘30s.”260 German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble referred to Putin’s methods for the annexation of Crimea as “already adopted 
by Hitler in the Sudetenland.”261 UK Prime Minister David Cameron, former Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and U.S. Senators John McCain and Marco 
Rubio all made remarks likening President Putin’s actions in Crimea to Hitler’s in 
Austria and/or Czechoslovakia.262 
Not surprisingly, comparing people or their actions to Hitler or his actions is not 
unique to Putin’s annexation of Crimea. This section reviews the phenomenon of Hitler 
comparisons since World War II and considers their potential effect on the general 
populace. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, Hitler and Nazism became the epitome 
and embodiment of evil to the vast majority of Americans, Europeans, and populations 
that fought the Axis Powers in World War II. The dissemination of photos of the 
atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis had a distinct effect on the American psyche and 
became a metaphor for evil itself. Through overuse, comparisons to Hitler became vague 
analogies for any evil acts and were abundant in discussions on ethics.263 
In 1953, German-American political philosopher Leo Strauss wrote that “we must 
avoid the fallacy that in the last decades has frequently been used as a substitute for the 
reductio ad absurdum: the reductio ad Hitlerum. A view is not refuted by the fact that it 
happens to have been shared by Hitler.”264 Also referred to as “playing the Nazi card,” 
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the fallacy expanded to include any “any fallacious argument that invokes Hitler, Nazism, 
or mechanisms of the Nazi regime to aid in creating or supporting a point.”265 Utilized by 
politicians, journalists, and others, the Nazi reference has been used to argue for or 
against the death penalty, gun control, evolutionism, abortion, and even Zionism, 
ironically.266 In 1990, Mike Godwin proposed Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies: “as an 
online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler 
approaches one.”267 The ultimate paradox of any comparisons is that Hitler and his Nazi 
followers remain in a category of one. People had committed mass murder with massive 
territorial ambitions before—including Joseph Stalin, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane—
but not with the Nazis’ vicious efficiency of industry and concentrated effort to 
completely eliminate an entire ethnicity. As a result, the Nazi comparison is used 
frequently and with great effect. 
Politicians, journalists, and others invoke Hitler comparisons in a wide spectrum 
of circumstances. The vandalism against a Jewish community in New York during the 
Crown Heights Riots in 1991 evoked Kristallnacht analogies, which in turn resulted in 
quick criticisms from the Jewish community—particularly from those who experienced 
the actual Kristallnacht in 1938.268 
The analogy is frequently condemned when it is evoked. However, several 
American presidents have used it, and to great effect. Lyndon Johnson compared the 
expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia to the aggression by Hitler in 1938 when 
explaining to the American people “why we are in Vietnam” in a 1965 speech.269 In 
1984, Ronald Reagan referred to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 to describe 
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U.S. foreign policy in Central America with regard to Nicaragua.270 In 1991, George H. 
W. Bush launched a barrage of direct and indirect comparisons of Hitler and Saddam 
Hussein in a campaign to vilify the Iraqi leader.271 Bush compared Hussein’s soldiers to 
the SS and Death’s Head Regiments, stated that there was a “direct parallel between what 
Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam Hussein has done to Kuwait,” and, after listing 
alleged Iraqi atrocities, simply concluded with “Hitler revisited.”272 George W. Bush 
recycled his father’s Hitler-Saddam analogy at a NATO summit in 2002273 and compared 
Osama Bin Laden to both Lenin and Hitler in 2006.274 
The list of examples is not exclusive to American leaders: Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez compared Israel’s actions in Lebanon with Hitler’s genocide275 and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has frequently asserted that there were neo-Nazi, Nazi, 
and fascist elements in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and Euromaidan.276 Putin has also 
compared the United States to the Third Reich: 
Putin went on in May [2007] to make remarks at a ceremony 
commemorating Soviet victory in the Second World War that were 
harsher still, reminiscent of the coldest days of the Cold War, when the 
“imperialist” West was painted in Soviet propaganda as the successor to 
Nazi Germany. The president’s message effectively accused the United 
States of threatening Russia and the rest of the world: “in our days such 
threats are not fewer. They are merely transforming, changing their 
appearance. And these new threats, as in the times of the Third Reich, 
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[carry] the same contempt for human life, the same claims to global 
exclusivity and diktat.”277 
The intent of these comparisons is transparent: to simplify complex foreign policy 
situations for mass consumption by demonizing and “discredit[ing]…adversaries” in 
order to garner support.278 
Media coverage of these public comparisons results in the transmission and 
amplification of these sentiments, which have a direct impact on public opinion and 
support for specific policies. Studies show that without exception American media 
accepted President George H. W. Bush’s Hitler-Hussein comparison and amplified the 
message to the American public.279 Furthermore, a majority saw it as legitimate: a poll 
cited by the New York Times reported that 60 percent of Americans agreed with the 
comparison.280 A study of English-, German-, and Spanish-language media showed that 
comparisons of Putin to Hitler started immediately after his election into the presidency 
in 2000, but spiked following his gas disputes with Ukraine in 2005–2009 and the Russo-
Georgian War in 2008, and nearly tripled following the annexation of Crimea.281 
Ironically, President Putin and the Kremlin have maintained a consistent counter-
narrative that neo-Nazis and fascists caused the Euromaidan ouster of Yanukovych and 
are currently in power in Kiev.282 Anti-Nazi rhetoric was a staple of Soviet doctrine and 
has continued to be a part of the post-Soviet vernacular since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.283 The state-controlled media in Russia amplify this narrative to an overwhelming 
reception. 94 percent of Russians got their news on the Crimean conflict through state-
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controlled television and an equally high percentage of Russians believed that annexing 
Crimea was the correct policy move in response to events in Ukraine.284 
In making these comparisons, policymakers influence the general public by 
associating a person or action with Hitler or the Nazis, who are almost universally 
decried as evil. Despite the media’s capacity to act as an independent influence on 
policymakers and the public, the political elites’ ability to influence the content of 
broadcasts and publications has a distinct effect on public opinion.285 An initially large 
“information gap” between policymakers and the public,286 coupled with a potential 
rally-round-the-flag appeal, produces a compelling galvanizing effect.287 The Hitler 
comparison is often an example of political elites utilizing the mass media to influence 
public opinion in order to legitimize existing or desired foreign policy.288 Regardless of 
any inherent inaccuracies in the analogy, the reference evokes a common knowledge and 
association with evil widely attributed to Hitler.289 Even negative comparisons—arguing 
that someone is not like Hitler—offer evidence that the reference is abundant in the 
media,290 and studies also show that people are more likely to associate negative 
correlations than if they had not heard the comparison at all.291 Policymakers and 
political elites are therefore capable of evoking a strong emotional response from the 
public through the invocation of the Hitler metaphor. Regardless of the apparent 
similarities or differences, public associations with Hitler and the Nazis can quickly 
polarize public opinion. 
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C. A “CRIMEAN ANSCHLUSS”? 
On March 3, 2014, the Moscow Times published an opinion article titled “Putin’s 
Crimean Anschluss.”292 The Financial Times published a similar article on March 8, 
2014 entitled, “We’ve Been Here Before—in 1938.”293 The mashup image of “Putler”—
a stylized likeness of Vladimir Putin with Hitler’s infamous parted undercut hairstyle and 
toothbrush mustache—became ubiquitous at protests of the annexation and throughout 
Ukraine.294 Professor Andrey Zubov of the Moscow State Institute of International 
Affairs was dismissed after writing an article comparing the Russian annexation of 
Crimea with Germany’s Anschluss with Austria in 1938.295 In response, Aleksandr 
Dugin—the head of a Kremlin-affiliated think-tank—lambasted Professor Zubov. Dugin 
claimed that if Hitler had stopped collecting German lands in 1939, “completing what 
Bismarck failed to do…then he would have remained a politician of the highest class.”296 
Ignoring the horrific Nazi actions and policies in place prior to Hitler’s invasion of 
Poland—including the Night of the Long Knives, Kristallnacht, and the Nuremburg 
Laws—the defense was alarming.297 It is imperative to analyze the differences and 
similarities between the invasions and annexations of Austria in 1938 and Crimea in 
2014. 
1. Revanchism, Irredentism, and Pan-Nationalism 
The most frequent and pertinent comparison between the German Anschluss with 
Austria and the Russian annexation of Crimea is the claim of protecting the rights of 
ethnic kin across borders. This is a broadly nonspecific, but nonetheless shared, theme in 
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both narratives of reunification. However, a closer inspection of the pan-national 
movements in Austria prior to the Anschluss and in Crimea prior to the 2014 annexation 
shows that they are of a markedly different character. 
The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the later fracture of 
relations between Prussia and Austria in 1866 led to the development of German and 
Austrian identities that often overlapped.298 The Pan-German movement of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had its origins in xenophobic sentiment resulting 
from a high influx of Czech and Jewish immigrants.299 With the downfall of the German 
and Habsburg Empires after World War I, the victors feared a stronger revanchist power. 
The short-lived Deutsche-Österreich Republic sought parity between its German and 
Austrian parts, but was nevertheless forbidden by the victors in World War I.300 The 
isolation of Austria during the Great Depression plunged it deeper into economic crisis. 
Austrian citizens in the throes of economic hardship saw their German neighbors rising 
meteorically in prosperity in the mid-to-late 1930s. In this context, a resurgence of 
xenophobic and nationalist sentiment led to a great outpouring of support for the 
Wehrmacht as it rolled across the borders in 1938.301 The endorsement from the Catholic 
Church and leftist politicians resulted in a landslide referendum in favor of “reunification 
of Austria and the German Reich.”302 The separate development of Germany and Austria 
as independent regional powers with similar ethno-national roots is strikingly different 
from Crimea’s colonial character. 
Conquered by Tsarist Russia in 1783, Crimea developed its patent Russian 
character as a result of mass-migration of ethnic Russians to replace emigrating Tatars 
and other indigenous ethnicities.303 Transferred to Ukraine in 1954 in celebration of the 
300th Anniversary of Ukraine’s pledged allegiance to the Russian Empire, the peninsula 
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became a legal part of the Ukrainian SSR.304 The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted 
in Ukrainian independence, and a nascent Crimean independence movement was placated 
with increased autonomy within Ukraine. Despite being a part of Ukraine’s sovereign 
territory, Crimea maintained its Russian culture and the vast majority of its residents 
spoke Russian as their first language.305 Since 1991, Crimea has been prominently pro-
Russian, and it had a latent secession movement prior to the annexation in 2014. The 
prestige associated with Crimea as one of the former crown jewels in Russia’s empire and 
the home to its Black Sea Fleet made it an icon of nostalgia for prior Russian power.306 
No two cases of ethno-national irredentism are likely to be identical. Pan-
Germanism in Austria before the Anschluss and Pan-Russianism in Crimea before 2014 
were drastically different. Revanchist and irredentist movements are many and varied: 
Alsace-Lorraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Hong Kong, etc. While historic and 
current cases may resemble one another in some ways, simply being a revanchist or 
irredentist movement does not imply similar origins, dynamics, ends, or means. 
2. The Wehrmacht and “Little Green Men” 
The actual events around the two annexations bear striking similarities, although 
certain key differences diminish the relevance of any such comparison. Aspects of the 
annexations resemble each other, but the greater implications of comparisons to Hitler’s 
regime are absent. While both Hitler and Putin reacted militarily to unfavorable political 
developments in Austria and Crimea, respectively, the purpose and nature of the military 
involvement were drastically different. Although both initiated referendums for 
reunification, Austria’s did not require electoral fraud while the validity of the Crimean 
referendum is surrounded by significant controversy and skepticism. Human rights 
violations followed in the wake of both annexations. However, Austria witnessed the 
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brutal persecution characteristic of the Nazis while Russian injustices restrict the liberal 
democratic freedoms of the political opposition.307 
Hitler’s failure to gain power through his political strong-arm tactics with 
Dollfuss and Schuschnigg pushed him to mobilize Operation Otto to prevent a 
referendum on Austrian independence.308 Similarly, the ouster of pro-Kremlin Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych impelled President Putin to mobilize Russian Special Forces in 
Crimea to secure Moscow’s military interests in the Black Sea.309 Furthermore, Austria 
had from the outset been a part of Hitler’s design for a greater Germany, and Hitler made 
this clear on the first page of Mein Kampf.310 While Crimean independence from Ukraine 
was a point of contention for the ethnic Russians on the peninsula and politicians in the 
Kremlin,311 the official line concerning Crimea was not revanchist. As long as Ukraine 
remained firmly in the Russian orbit, Putin would recognize its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. In 2010, the lease on Russia’s military bases in Crimea was extended for 25 
years from 2017.312 As soon as a revolution in Kiev threatened those interests, the gears 
of war started turning. While the Black Sea Fleet lease had been extended, full 
incorporation of Crimea by Russia removed restrictions on the fleet’s expansion.313 
Almost overnight Russia surpassed Turkey as the most powerful Navy in the Black Sea, 
owing in part to Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian ships.314 Putin commented directly that 
Russia could not allow a “historical part of the Russian territory with a predominantly 
ethnic Russian population to be incorporated into an international military alliance”; and 
that it would mean that “Russia would be practically ousted from the Black Sea area.”315 
Although Putin used the ethno-revanchist sentiment as an argument for annexation, the 
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move was a strategic one designed to prevent NATO basing in Ukraine and therefore 
probably not the first pawn captured in reuniting all Russian-speaking peoples under 
Moscow’s rule. While increasing nationalist rhetoric has affected Ukraine-Russia 
relations since 1991, the nationalist doctrine espoused in official comments concerning 
Ukraine and Crimea after February 2014 does not explain the policies and actions of the 
Kremlin.316 
When Austrians were asked in April 1938 if they agreed with the “reunification of 
Austria and the German Reich,” two thirds of the 6.7-million-person population turned 
out to cast a vote: 99.73 percent voted “yes.”317 Hitler’s courtship of the Catholic Church 
and the remaining organized labor unions in Austria—particularly Vienna—resulted in 
the endorsement of Austrian Primate Cardinal Theodor Innitzer and the most prominent 
Social Democrat, Karl Renner.318 Despite the pagan ideology of the Nazis and Renner’s 
denouncement of the means of invasion, both Innitzer and Renner encouraged their 
followers to vote “yes.”319 Furthermore, the Nazis wasted no time in disposing of the 
political opposition and Austrian Jews: the SS detained 21,000 people in March and April 
1938 alone.320 The existing pan-German attitudes, the endorsement by major public 
figures, and the elimination and intimidation of the political opposition negated the need 
for any falsification of ballots.321 
The Crimean referendum, in contrast, has been shrouded in more controversy. 
Within two weeks of the appearance of unmarked Russian forces, “local self-defense 
units” stormed the Crimean Parliament. Barring and dismissing several representatives 
during closed-door sessions, the Parliament issued a declaration of independence and 
announced a referendum in five days’ time.322 The plebiscite did not include an option to 
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maintain the status quo, armed soldiers were in the streets, and non-Russian minority 
leaders called for a boycott of the referendum. The United Nations’ International Court of 
Justice ruled that the declaration of independence was invalid due to the unauthorized use 
of force and the presence of “paramilitary and self-defense units…was not conducive to 
an environment in which the will of voters could be exercised freely.”323 Although the 
presence of armed forces in both situations did not encourage such an environment, the 
results of the Crimean referendum were suspect. President Putin alleged in his March 18, 
2014 speech that there was an 82 percent voter turnout, with 96 percent in favor of 
reunification.324 However, the Russian President’s Council on Civil Society and Human 
Rights reported a 30 percent voter turnout with roughly 50 percent voting in favor of 
reunification; other sources reported even slighter support.325 If the latter numbers are 
correct, reunification is the preference of only 15 percent of the Crimean population, 
instead of the 78 percent claimed by President Putin. 
Granted, neither referendum reflected the democratic ideal. The Wehrmacht 
presence, SS arrests, and political intimidation absolutely did not encourage a safe and 
fair voting environment. Nevertheless, if widespread fraud was not employed in the 
Austrian referendum, 60 percent of eligible Austrians voted in favor of annexation: a 
likely result concerning popular sentiment at the time. The conflicting reports of the 
Crimean referendum cast a skeptical shadow over an already internationally condemned 
vote. The vote in Crimea was a façade of being “in full compliance with democratic 
procedures and international norms,”326 as Putin referred to it, regardless of the United 
Nations General Assembly denunciation. Despite the aggressive and expansionist nature 
of the Nazis’ invasion, the Anschluss was the will of the majority, while Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea was probably not. 
Hitler’s pursuit of a “racially homogeneous national community” is the first time 
that any state has attempted to rid itself of all supposedly racially inferior populations on 
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such an enormous scale.327 It remains the most extreme large-scale instance of such 
atrocities.328 Policies of exclusion, exploitation, and extermination of Jews, Gypsies, 
homosexuals, Slavs, and others were central to the Nazis’ ideology and the basis of their 
pursuit of domination.329 If Hitler had been successful, the mass-killing would have 
continued. In pursuit of Lebensraum—or living space—for the German people in the 
East, Hitler intended to destroy Poland and the USSR. According to Snyder, thirty 
million would have starved the first winter, while tens of millions would have been 
“expelled, killed, assimilated, or enslaved thereafter.”330 Hitler and the Nazi leadership 
were intent on ruling their occupied lands with an iron fist, lording over those they 
perceived as inferior. A multitude of emperors, kings, and rulers have conquered lands, 
massacring and enslaving their inhabitants. Hitler and the Nazis were the first to do it 
with industrial efficiency and with the express goal of completely eliminating an entire 
ethnicity. Such a genocidal agenda is absent from President Putin’s geopolitical 
endeavors, despite the extreme expansionist views articulated by Aleksandr Dugin and 
other Kremlin advisors.331 
The mysterious appearance in Crimea of Russian special forces without insignia 
in February and March 2014 initiated a sequence of events that resulted in a series of 
human rights violations. A genocidal agenda however, has never been a part of Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea. Since the declaration of independence and annexation of Crimea, 
Russian rule of the peninsula has resulted in a series of transgressions against the non-
Russian minorities. Authorities prohibited public gatherings and exiled Crimean Tatar 
leaders that refused to acknowledge the annexation.332 Declaring all residents without 
Russian passports illegal aliens, harassment of dissenters, banning Ukrainian television 
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broadcasts, and terminating all Ukrainian-language programs in schools are blatant 
restrictions on Crimean residents’ human rights and counter to the international norms of 
a liberal democracy.333 
Nevertheless, while Hitler’s dogma was centered around anti-Semitism and a 
deep racial hatred, Putin’s rhetoric is completely void of any such verbiage. The Russian 
President even acknowledged the mistreatment of the Crimean Tatar populace during 
Soviet times, promising to aid in the rehabilitation of displaced Tatars.334 Putin further 
stated, “We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is 
their common home, their motherland.”335 Although Putin conducted the clandestine 
invasion and annexation of Crimea behind a veil of protecting ethnic Russians and 
Russian nationals, ethno-nationalism does not necessarily lead to the genocide of 
minorities. 
Hitler’s and Putin’s annexations and territorial acquisitions show similarities to 
other irredentist land grabs in international history. The two admittedly authoritarian 
leaders are dissimilar in the most significant defining characteristic of Hitler’s regime: 
genocide. Although Hitler and Putin exhibited revanchist actions, ill-informed 
comparisons polarize public opinion and inhibit dialogue. Nazi atrocities in the 1930s and 
1940s remain in a singular category, and comparisons with the Nazis breed resentment 
and restrict diplomatic relations. 
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“Let me give you an analogy; analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but they can 
make one feel more at home.”336 Sigmund Freud insisted that analogies were necessary 
in psychoanalysis, although one must constantly change the analogy to fit one’s purpose. 
Writing in 1933, Freud fittingly used an analogy of ethnic geography to explain the 
interactions of the id, the ego, and the superego. The Germans that herded cattle in the 
hills were not completely isolated, but intermixed with and influenced the Magyars that 
grew cereals in the plains and the Slovaks that fished the lakes.337 Inevitably, 
characteristics of the id, the ego, and the superego will diverge just as those of the 
Germans, the Magyars, and the Slovaks will diverge. Indeed, by definition all analogies 
are false and incomplete. Nevertheless, as George Santayana’s famous maxim warns, 
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”338 The difficulty, 
however, is in remembering the past correctly. 
Ernest May demonstrates that when policymakers have used historical precedents 
to influence their decision-making the results have often been flawed. In the cases May 
reviewed, politicians’ reading of history was based on perceived connections that were 
“narrowly selected and subjected to no deliberate scrutiny or analysis.”339 The superficial 
nature of the analysis led to a lack of consideration of potential alternatives, 
repercussions, or “discontinuities.”340 If revanchist actors with nationalist dogmas are 
framed as “the next Hitler” or “just like Hitler,” it limits the scope or inclination of 
policymakers to engage in a thorough and searching appraisal of the situation and can 
lead to painting with broad, inaccurate strokes. In addition to distorting policymaking, the 
ill-founded comparison can have detrimental effects on diplomatic relationships. 
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Since Hitler has become the personification of evil worldwide, notably in 
societies that fought the Nazi war machine, a comparison to him is tantamount to an 
accusation of constituting the same evil. The massive casualties sustained by the Soviet 
Union while fighting the Nazis deepens the negative stigma in Russia and drawing such a 
parallel does not foster cooperation. Hillary Clinton’s comparison elicited a rebuke from 
President Putin. According to Putin, “When people push boundaries too far, it’s not 
because they are strong but because they are weak. But maybe weakness is not the worst 
quality for a woman.”341 At the time of this writing, the former First Lady, U.S. Senator 
from New York, and Secretary of State is a presidential candidate in the 2016 election. 
Her use of the Hitler comparison could have drastically negative effects on the personal 
relationship between the presidents of the two largest nuclear powers, should she be 
elected president. Regardless of the hypothetical nature of this conjecture, it suggests the 
possible adverse consequences of such superficial analogies. 
Moreover, as noted in Chapter IV, Putin on at least one occasion in 2007 
compared the United States to the Third Reich.  Such insulting comparisons do not foster 
the cultivation of constructive relations between Washington and Moscow.  Nor do 
Russian characterizations of the Kiev government as "fascist" and "neo-Nazi" promote 
positive relations and conflict resolution. 
The violent pursuit of nationalist agendas resulted in unprecedented devastation 
and suffering in the two world wars of the twentieth century, and responsible 
governments should strive to prevent such a recurrence. Nationalism, however, is a recent 
phenomenon with regard to “the notion of political unity and independence.”342 Just as 
the nature of nationalism has evolved since its inception, it continues to change with 
modernity and globalization.343 If the recent resurgence of nationalism in Europe is 
analyzed using antiquated analogies and concepts, then policies and strategies to cope 
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with its potential outcomes will not be as effective as remedies adapted to the new 
challenges. It is imperative that the nationalist character of each case be individually 
assessed when addressing foreign policy. If modern neo-nationalism is analyzed with the 
model of fascist nationalism utilized by Hitler, then the successful conduct of foreign 
policy will inevitably be hampered. 
Vladimir Putin is not Adolf Hitler. Crimea is not Austria. To frame the Crimean 
situation in terms recalling Hitler and the Nazi German Anschluss with Austria is to 
compare a current member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and key interlocutor in the 
NATO-Russia Council to a genocidal dictator at a time when relations are already icy. 
Unnecessary barriers to dialogue and cooperation can only aggravate antagonism and 
postpone potential solutions to security issues. Analogies to Hitler and the Nazis 
galvanize public opinion against a potential adversary by oversimplifying complex 
situations and vilifying the antagonist. Such analogies are therefore counterproductive. 
Sigmund Freud was correct: analogies make people feel more comfortable in coming to 
conclusions but they generally decide nothing of value. If an ill-founded analogy leads to 
unsound conclusions, the consequences may be catastrophic. 
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